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CAPPING CARBON 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article addresses the problem of how to set caps for a cap-and-
trade program, a key problem in pending legislation addressing global climate 
disruption.  Previous scholarship on emissions trading programs focuses 
overwhelmingly on trading’s advantages and sometimes wrongly portrays 
environmental improvement as an automatic byproduct of adopting a cap-and-
trade approach. A trading program’s success, however, depends critically upon 
timely and effective cap setting.   
This article shows that often regulators have employed a best available 
technology (BAT) approach to cap setting for trading programs, i.e., setting the 
cap at a level that regulated polluters can achieve with government-identified 
technology.  This descriptive claim suggests that trading does not necessarily 
provide an antidote to the problems associated with BAT regulation, as the 
literature often claims; instead trading programs often constitute a form of BAT 
regulation in many respects.  The rest of the article explores this insight’s 
implications. 
Analytically, this article reviews three ways to establish aggregate caps, 
effects-based, cost-benefit based, and technology-based cap setting.  It shows 
that each of these approaches has theoretical and practical advantages and 
disadvantages, but only effects-based cap setting frees the regulator from the 
need to evaluate technologies in order to establish a cap.   
Since trading does not automatically transcend BAT, this article 
provides recommendations on how to improve cap setting both generally and in 
the climate disruption context.  It suggests that in the climate disruption context 
a legislative effects-based approach offers an attractive and viable cap-setting 
method.  But normative acceptance of effects-based caps requires some 
adjustments in how we think about costs, mainly a recognition that they are 
neither fixed nor predictable, but can change as a result of a cap-and-trade 
program.  This article also shows that auctions can play an important role in 
facilitating avoidance of the problems of administrative delay and strife that 
accompanied BAT regulation.  While commentators usually agree that auctions 
offer economic advantages, the literature has not paid sufficient attention to 
their administrative advantages.  We should think of auctions as essential to 
effective cap setting, not just as a nice way of avoiding unattractive 
distributional consequences like windfall profits.  But this article also explores 
how the possibility of BAT-like administrative delay should influence criteria 
and administrative procedures for agency distribution of allowances to firms.  
Finally, this article makes recommendation on how cap-setting decisions can 
circumvent favoritism toward existing sources and the difficulty of revising 
limits once establishes— both BAT problems that can arise under trading as 
well.  Thus, jettisoning the notion that trading automatically avoids problems 
traditionally associated with BAT leads to a set of useful insights about how to 
set caps. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 This article addresses the problem of how to set caps — limits on 
the pollution from identified facilities — for cap-and-trade programs, a 
key problem in pending legislation addressing global climate disruption.1  
Cap-and-trade programs establish caps on regulated polluters’ emissions, 
but allow these polluters to forego meeting their caps if they pay other 
regulated polluters to go below their assigned cap.2  This article 
describes how we have set caps for trading programs in the past and 
explains how we can do better in setting caps for the cap-and-trade 
programs addressing global climate disruption.3   
                                                
1 See Nathaniel O. Keohane, Cap-and-Trade Rehabilitated:  Using Tradable Permits to 
Control U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 3 REV. ENVT’L ECON. & POL’Y 42, 43 (2009) 
(describing a cap as a limit on “total allowable emissions”).  I generally use the term 
“climate disruption,” because scientists expect warmer average surface temperatures to 
disrupt global ecosystems.  See Perry Wallace, An Overview of This Issue:  Climate 
Change in 2009, 9 SUST. DEV. L. & POL’Y 2 (2009) (listing threats to food production, 
contamination of fresh water, catastrophic flooding, and pests in new terrain as 
potential consequences of climate change).   The literature more often refers to climate 
disruption as either “climate change” or “global warming.”   See, e.g., CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007:  IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, vii (Michael Parry et al. 
eds., 2007) [hereinafter IMPACTS].  The “global warming” term describes a central 
scientific finding, that human emission of greenhouse gases have raised the earth’s 
average surface temperature, but says nothing about why warming is a problem.  The 
term “climate change” is accurate, but conveys nothing about the change’s nature.  See 
generally id. (assessing anticipated changes).  Hence, the term “climate disruption” 
more cogently  describes the heart of the phenomenon.   
2 See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program, 55 
WASH & LEE L. REV. 289, 289 & n. 2 (1998) (trading allows polluters to “avoid 
pollution reductions at a regulated source if they provide an equivalent reduction 
elsewhere”). 
3 I use the term “cap-and-trade program” to describe the programs created in pending 
climate change bills because most environmental lawyers use this term in this way.  But 
this is not a completely accurate description.  A pure cap-and-trade program only 
allows facilities with capped emissions to purchase credits from other facilities subject 
to caps. See Grant Boyle et al., Transitioning from the CDM to the Clean Development 
Fund, 3 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 16, 17 (2009) (describing a cap-and-trade program 
as one that allows “regulated entities” to “trade . . . among themselves”).  The programs 
in these bills, however, allow offset credits, i.e. credits generated by facilities not 
subject to caps.  These offset credits have been justly controversial, as they greatly 
magnify the program’s potential integrity problems.   See id. (describing the an offset 
program as demanding proof of environmental integrity on a case-by-case basis). 
Technically, these programs are hybrid programs, because they feature a mass-based 
cap like a cap-and-trade program, but allow owners of capped facilities to use at least 
some offset credits from sources without caps.  
2 
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 This topic has enormous importance.4  The election of President 
Obama and a sympathetic Congress makes a national cap-and-trade 
program meaningfully addressing climate disruption very likely.5  The 
federal government is not alone in embracing this form of emissions 
trading.  The European Union,6 other developed countries, several U.S.  
states,7 and the Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (Kyoto Protocol)8 have placed variants upon a cap-and-trade 
program at the heart of international, national, and regional efforts to 
address climate disruption.9  This development comports with a vast 
“instrument choice” literature affirming cap-and-trade’s value.10   
 This literature, however, has paid much more attention to the 
advantages of trading emission reduction obligations than it has to the 
problem of establishing a cap.11  Indeed, several commentators have 
                                                
4 See ALLOCATION IN THE EUROPEAN EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME:  RIGHTS, RENTS, 
AND FAIRNESS 4 (A. Denny Ellerman et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter EU ALLOCATION] 
(describing the “process of creating and distributing allowances” as “very important”); 
see generally Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a Private 
Property Solution, 78 COLO. L. REV. 533, 534 (2007) (describing the question of “how 
much pollution” to allow as a “central question of environmental policy”). 
5 See Dean Scott, Senate Supporters Waiting for House Action; White House Reaching 
Out to Moderates, 40 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 807 (April 10, 2009) (describing Obama’s call 
for a 14% cut from 2005 levels by 2020 and 83% cut below 2005 levels by 2050 with 
all allowances auctioned); Kenneth R. Richards & Stephanie Hayes Richards, The 
Evolution and Anatomy of Recent Climate Change Bills in the U.S. Senate:  Critique 
and Recommendations, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1368903 
(2009) (characterizing the three major Senate climate change bills as “cap-and-trade 
legislation”). 
6 See Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L275) (EC) [hereinafter EU Directive]. 
7 See Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Memorandum of Understanding (December 
20, 2005),  http://rggi.org/docs/mou_12_20_05.pdf. [hereinafter RGGI MOU]. 
8 December 11, 1997, Report to the Conference of the Parties on its Third Session, 3rd 
Sess. Pt. 2, Annex I, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) 
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].   
9 See EMISSIONS TRADING:  INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, DECISION MAKING AND 
CORPORATE STRATEGIES, xiv-xviii (Ralf Antes et al. eds., 2008) (canvassing program in 
effect or planned in 2008) [hereinafter INSTITUTIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING]. 
10 See Marjan Peeters & Stefan Weishaar, Exploring Uncertainties in the EU ETS:  
“Learning by Doing” Continues Beyond 2012, 3 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 88,  89 
(2009) (finding that “significant academic literatures” support emissions trading); 
Keohane, supra note 1, at 42-43 (describing emissions trading as a standard 
prescription of economists); Sinden, supra note 4, at 537-38 (describing emissions 
trading as a preferred policy of “extremists and moderates alike”); see also James 
Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 607, 609 (2000) (pointing out that “[e]very major environmental policy 
review in the last five years has called for even greater use of” trading) . 
11 See Lesley McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade:  Moving 
Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 101, 104 (2009) (noting that little has been 
written about how to set caps).  Cf. Sinden, supra note 4, at 566-67 (explaining that 
trading has been categorized as an example of “privatization,” a characterization that 
ignores the government role in setting caps).  Very recently, a narrow empirical 
3 
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obscured the problem by suggesting, wrongly, that cap-and-trade 
programs “automatically” reduce emissions.12  Setting the cap properly 
matters more to environmental protection than the decision to allow, or 
not allow, trades.13  In the climate disruption context an insufficiently 
stringent cap, or one set too late, can have disastrous consequences, 
because every ton of carbon emitted while governments struggle to 
establish strict caps remains in the atmosphere for an extremely long 
time, contributing to future warming.14 We already live in a much 
warmer world that has significantly impacted our environment because 
we have waited so long to set caps.15  If the world becomes much 
warmer still while governments struggle to establish meaningful caps, 
serious irreversible consequences may well occur.16 
                                                                                                                   
literature has developed reporting on the cap setting experience arising from the 
European Union’s emissions trading scheme.  See, e.g., Harro van Asselt, Book 
Reviews, 3 CARBON  & CLIMATE L. REV. 124 (2009) (reviewing three books on EU 
emissions trading, which include discussion of cap setting).    
12 See David M. Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun 
Wedding:  Emissions Trading under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L. J. 21, 61 (2008) 
(noting that trading advocates’ assertion that trading “automatically” reduce emissions 
obscures the cap’s importance); Ruth Greenspan Bell & Clifford Russell, Ill-
Considered Experiment:  The Environmental Consensus and the Developing World, 24 
HARV. INT’L REV.  20, 24 (2003) (showing that proponents of “market-based 
instruments” claim that they “almost automatically” achieve “desired levels of 
environmental quality”).  Cf. Lesley K. McAllister, Beyond Playing “Banker”:  The 
Role of the Regulatory Agency in Emissions Trading, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 269, 270 
(2007) (characterizing the prevailing view of the regulator’s role in trading as being a 
banker).   
13 See McAllister, supra note 11, at 102 (pointing out that environmental performance 
of a cap-and-trade-program depends on the cap’s level); Dallas Burtraw et al., 
Economics of Pollution Trading for SO2 and NOx, 30 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RESOURCES, 
253, 259 (2005) (describing the cap level as the “key factor” in a cap-and-trade 
program’s environmental success); Byron Swift, How Environmental Laws Work:  An 
Analysis of the Utility Sector’s Response to Regulation of Nitrogen Oxides and Sulfur 
Dioxide under the Clean Air Act, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 309, 315 (2001) (describing the 
acid rain program’s cap as the program’s “ most important element”). 
14 See Lisa Heinzerling & Frank Ackerman, Law and Economics for a Warming World, 
1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 331, 333 (2007) (pointing out that carbon dioxide, the most 
important greenhouse gas, has a half-life in the atmosphere of a little over a century). 
15 See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 9, 12 (2009),  
http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf. 
(explaining that temperatures have already increased by an average of about 1.5◦F since 
1900 and mentioning effects this warming has already produced). 
16 See IMPACTS, supra note 1, at 11-18 (summarizing future impacts and describing how 
they vary with temperature increase); CLIMATE CHANGE 2007:  MITIGATION OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE 127-28 (Bert Metz et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter, MITIGATION] 
(discussing irreversibility and the potential for catastrophe); AVOIDING DANGEROUS 
CLIMATE CHANGE 11, 265 (Hans Joachim Schnellnhuber et al. eds., 2006) (discussing 
the potential for large non-linear climate impacts once unknown tipping points are 
reached); see also Robert L. Glicksman, Katrina Consequences:  What Has the 
4 
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 Descriptively, this article shows that a Best Available 
Technology (BAT) approach has dominated many efforts to set caps for 
emissions trading programs.  Under this approach, governments establish 
mass-based caps or rate-based emission limits for a trading program 
grounded in an evaluation of what the regulated industry can achieve at 
its own facilities with available government-identified technology.  This 
claim that BAT often controls cap setting for trading raises profound 
questions about environmental legal theory.  For scholars usually 
describe trading as an antidote to the delay and complexity associated 
with BAT regulation.17  My description suggests that emissions trading 
often becomes a form of BAT regulation, rather than an alternative to it.  
This suggestion implies that cap-and-trade programs do not necessarily 
deliver better environmental performance than the BAT regulations they 
aim to replace, a troublesome conclusion give the seriousness of the 
climate disruption problem.18  The rest of the article explores this 
insight’s implications.  
 Analytically, this article compares BAT caps to the main 
alternatives to it, effects-based caps set to avoid unacceptable 
environmental consequences and caps set using cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) to establish an “efficient” level of reduction.  This analysis shows 
that all of three of these approaches have significant practical and 
normative advantages and disadvantages.  Only an effects-based 
approach, however, avoids the technology evaluation problems 
associated with BAT.   
 Normatively, the article shows that a legislative effects-based 
approach offers the potential to vastly improve our effort to avoid 
dangerous climate disruption.19  Realizing the potential benefits of 
effects-based cap setting requires a change in our thinking about how to 
set environmental goals. Setting caps without consideration of particular 
                                                                                                                   
Government Learned?, 52 LOYOLA L. REV. 1127, 1134-1157 (2006) (discussing the 
potential links between climate change and hurricanes); Heinzerling & Ackerman, 
supra note 14, at 334 (discussing the uncertainty of risks of various irreversible 
catastrophes, including melting of major ice sheets, sudden release of large amounts of 
methane from tundra, and major shifts in ocean currents). 
17 See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Comment:  Reforming Environmental 
Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1334-1341 (1985) (describing BAT as the slow and 
complicated status quo and claiming that tradable permits “at one stroke, cure many of” 
command and control’s “basic flaws”); Sinden, supra note 4, at 567 (claiming that 
Ackerman and Stewart’s work gave trading “a foothold in environmental policy 
debates”). 
18 In saying this, I do not mean to question some of the economic advantages Ackerman 
and Stewart ascribe to emissions trading.  See, e.g., id. at 1341-42 (claiming that 
emissions trading “bring[s] about a least cost allocation of control burdens, saving 
many billions of dollars”). 
19 See generally AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16 (discussing 
dangerous climate change both conceptually and scientifically). 
5 
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technologies will require that we deemphasize cost considerations in 
setting caps.  This suggestion runs against recent trends in environmental 
law, but this article defends this step in the climate disruption context. 
 Trading’s susceptibility to BAT-like problems means that 
legislatures should seek to avoid litigation and delay in establishing 
caps.20  Auctioning permits, rather than allocating them through 
administrative decision-making, provides a means of avoiding BAT-like 
delays in establishing meaningful caps.  Many regulators and scholars 
recognize that auctioning enhances efficiency, avoids windfall profits, 
and generates revenues that government can spend to further advance 
environmental or other societal goals, but they have not fully appreciated 
its importance in avoiding serious administrative difficulties.21  This 
insight should lead Congress to view complete early auctioning as vitally 
important to the success of the trading program, not just as an optional 
improvement to be phased-in over time.  To the extent that Congress 
allows administrative cap setting, it should take pains to minimize the 
potential for those processes to get bogged down in administrative 
controversies and litigation.   
 In order to focus on caps, this article will not address questions 
about how to design trading properly to realize the goals embodied in 
caps.22  While the existence of this enforcement issue shows that the 
                                                
20 See David M. Driesen & Amy Sinden, The Missing Instrument:  Dirty Input Limits, 
33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 65, 88-90  (2009) (explaining the administrative efficiency 
advantages of Dirty Input Limits and pointing out that efficient use of administrative 
resources is very important to meeting environmental goals). 
21 See Council Directive 2009/29/EC, 2009 O.J. L 140/63 preamble (15) (2009) 
[hereinafter 2009 EU Amendments] (declaring that auctioning should be “the basic 
principle” for the revised EU scheme because of its efficiency and the need to 
“eliminate windfall profits”).   Cf.  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, 
Combating Global Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global 
Warming Than Cap and Trade,  28 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3, 6 (2009) (recognizing that a 
cumbersome rulemaking process and litigation can delay operation of a cap-and-trade 
system, but not an auction’s potential for avoiding that outcome); McCallister, supra 
note 11, at 144 (pointing out that an “auction could eliminate many of the opportunities 
to influence the allocation process” in ways that raise the cap); European Commission, 
Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading within the European Union, 
COM(2008)87 § 7.3 (pointing out that “auctioning avoids . . . difficult and politically 
delicate” decisions about allocating allowances to particular companies). 
22 Cf. David M Driesen, Linkage and Multilevel Governance, 19 DUKE J. OF COMP. & 
INT’L L. 389 (2009) (explaining how concerns about compliance tend to generate 
complex rules from numerous governments under the Kyoto Protocol); Michael Wara, 
Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and Potential, 55 UCLA 
L. REV. 1759 (2008) (discussing “additionality” problems that can interfere with 
achieving a cap); Lesley K. McAllister, Putting Persuasion Back in the Equation:  
Compliance in Cap-and- Trade Programs, 24 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.  299 (2007) 
(examining differences between compliance assurance in cap-and-trade programs and 
in the BAT context). 
6 
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notion that trading automatically generates reductions is wrong, 
resolution of the question of how to ensure compliance with a cap lies 
beyond this article’s scope.23     
  This article begins with background on emissions trading and its 
role in addressing climate disruption, which establishes some relevant 
concepts and history.  This background information shows that the 
environmental case for emissions trading relies heavily on viewing it as 
an antidote to the complexities limiting the efficacy of the BAT 
approach.  The second part lays the analytical groundwork for the 
normative claims to follow, by discussing the possible ways to set caps, 
contrasting BAT, effects-based, and cost-benefit approaches to this task.  
This section also contains the meat of the descriptive claim, as it 
examines the BAT approach’s role in establishing caps in enacted 
emissions trading programs.  Part III explains the analysis’ implications 
for trading design, changing our thinking about environmental law, and 
climate change bills pending in Congress. 
 
I.  EMISSIONS TRADING AND CLIMATE DISRUPTION 
 This part first discusses how scholars have traditionally viewed 
trading as an antidote to various problems with BAT. It then discusses 
trading’s applicability to the climate disruption problem.  This treatment 
of trading’s intellectual and practical history focuses heavily on the cap’s 
role in trading programs, and introduces some critical distinctions 
between different types of caps. 
 
A.  Emissions Trading as An Antidote to BAT 
 1.  BAT—Regulators have traditionally regulated pollution 
predominantly by establishing uniform performance standards i.e. 
standards that apply the same quantitative pollution reduction 
requirement to each facility within an industry.24 These performance 
standards often take the form of a rate-based emission limit, such as a 
limit on the amount of pollution per unit of output.25  While 
                                                
23 Cf. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1344 (pointing out that auction revenue 
could fund enhanced enforcement).    
24 See id. at 1335 (noting uniform standards’ prevalence).  Cf. Driesen, supra note 2, at 
308 n. 93 (pointing out that sometimes regulators employ non-uniform standards). 
25 See D. Dudek & A. Golub, “Intensity Targets:  Pathway or Roadblock to Preventing 
Climate Change While Enhancing Economic Growth, 3S2 CLIMATE POL’Y S21, S23 
(2003) (defining an intensity target as “an emissions rate per unit” of production); 
Benito Müller & George Müller-Fürstenberger, Price-Related Sensitivities of 
Greenhouse Gas Intensity Targets, 3S2 CLIMATE POL’Y S59,S72 (2003) (describing 
emission intensity in its “most basic . . . guise” as “emissions per physical unit of 
production”); see, e.g., Byron Swift, Command Without Control:  Why Cap-and-Trade 
7 
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commentators often use the word “cap” to refer to a mass-based limit 
only,26 this article will use the term to refer to both mass-based and rate-
based limits,27 as both types of standards arise in trading programs and 
pose almost identical issues for regulators setting the limits.28 
 Economists have long complained that uniform performance 
standards use private capital paying for pollution control inefficiently.29  
Facilities within an industry often have widely varying marginal control 
costs.30  When marginal control costs vary, regulators can, in theory at 
least, achieve the same aggregate pollution reduction goal for an industry 
that a uniform standards realizes far more cheaply through non-uniform 
standards tailored to each facility’s marginal control cost.31   Facilities 
confronting relatively high pollution control costs could make fewer 
reductions than a uniform standard requires and facilities blessed with 
relatively low costs could make more reductions than a uniform standard 
requires, while the regulated industry as a whole still achieves the same 
aggregate reduction level that a uniform standard demands.32  This sort 
of fine-tuning would lower the overall cost of achieving an aggregate 
pollution reduction goal.33   
                                                                                                                   
Should Replace Rate Standards for Regional Pollutants, 31 ENVT’L L. REP. (Envtl. L. 
Inst.) 10330, 10332-34 (2001) (reviewing utility standards based on pounds of 
emissions per British Thermal Units of electricity produced).  
26 See, e.g., Carolyn Fischer, Combining Rate-Based and Cap-and-Trade Emissions 
Policies, 3S2 CLIMATE POL’Y S89, S92-93 (2003) (describing a system with a mass-
based cap as a “cap-and-trade system” and one based on a rate-based standard as a 
“tradable performance standard”); MARKET BASED APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY:  REGULATORY INNOVATIONS TO THE FORE  160  (Richard F. Kosobud & 
Jennifer M. Zimmerman eds., 1997) [hereinafter MARKET-BASED APPROACHES] 
(describing permits based on emission rates as not establishing a firm cap on emissions 
in the context of contrasting different trading approaches). 
27 Cf. A. Denny Ellerman & Ian Sue Wing, Absolute Versus Intensity-based Emission 
Caps, 3S2 CLIMATE POL’Y S7, S8 (2003) (employing the term cap to refer to absolute or 
rate-based limits). 
28 See id. at S7-S8 (pointing out that rate-based “intensity targets” are more common 
than mass-based caps); Fischer, supra note 26, at S89 (pointing out that tradable permits 
program use both rate-based [intensity] targets and mass-based caps); see also DAVID 
M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 195-197 (2003) 
(explaining why mass-based limits offer a better economic dynamic than rate-based 
limits). 
29 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1335, 1337-1340 (finding that “[u]niform 
BAT requirements waste may billions of dollar annually” and supporting this point with 
citation of the economics literature). 
30 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 307 (noting that facilities’ unequal compliance costs 
imply that trading will produce significant cost savings). 
31 See id. (noting that when control costs vary significantly tailoring reductions to match 
facility’s marginal control costs can improve efficient use of private sector resources). 
32 See id. at 334 (explaining that trading provides incentives for high cost polluters to 
increase emissions and low cost polluters to decrease emissions). 
33 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1341-42 (explaining that trading tends to 
produce a “least-cost allocation of control burdens”). 
8 
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 Yet, regulators use uniform standards precisely in order to avoid 
the massive administrative costs involved in tailoring caps to match each 
facility’s individual characteristics.34  When establishing uniform 
standards using a BAT approach, regulators begin by identifying 
technologies capable of reducing targeted pollution.  While critics decry 
regulators’ tendency to rely on end-of-the-pipe technologies in 
establishing BAT standards, regulators may take fuel switching and other 
kinds of measures into account in setting BAT standards.35  To establish 
a BAT standard, regulators must gather some data on the identified 
technologies’ performance and cost.36  They use this information to 
evaluate how much reduction is feasible and set limits based on the 
capabilities and cost of the technologies they evaluate.37 
 When promulgating a uniform BAT standard they can proceed 
without good data from every facility in an industry. BAT standard 
setting provisions often authorize or require a short cut, a benchmarking 
procedure where EPA sets its standards at the level that the best 
performers in the regulated industry have achieved.38  This 
benchmarking approach assumes that polluters can use the technologies 
that others have used in order to emulate their pollution control 
achievements.39  Thus, benchmarking reduces the administrative burdens 
associated with figuring out a BAT level.  
 
 2. Intellectual History of Trading as a BAT —Emissions trading 
facilitates cost efficient tailoring of emission reduction obligations, the 
standard account tells us, without requiring the regulator to develop 
marginal control cost and pollution control performance data for 
                                                
34 See POLLUTION FOR SALE:  EMISSIONS TRADING AND JOINT IMPLEMENTATION (Steve 
Sorrell & Jim Skea, eds., 1999) (opining that regulators could not fine-tune regulation 
to realize cost effective abatement, because they “would not have access to . . . detailed 
cost information”).  
35 See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(A) (requiring consideration of pollution prevention in 
establish effluent limitation guidelines); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(d)((A) (allowing 
consideration of pollution prevention measures), 7412(a)(7) (including pollution 
prevention and fuel treatment); DRIESEN, supra note 28, at 199 (explaining that EPA 
has been reluctant to establish standards based on pollution prevention because of a 
desire not to interfere with operational flexibility). 
36 David M. Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety 
Protection:  The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 
32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 12 (2005) (explaining that evaluating feasibility, as one 
does in writing BAT standards, requires evaluation of technology’s performance and 
cost). 
37 See id. at 8-21 (describing in detail how one might determine the maximum feasible 
reductions to choose the BAT level). 
38 See id. at 44-45 (describing this benchmarking approach as a “follow-the leader 
principle.”). 
39 See id. at 45 (describing benchmarking as based on an assumption “that pollution 
sources can achieve what the leading companies can achieve.”). 
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regulated facilities.40  On this model, regulators impose some sort of 
performance standard, but they authorize polluters to forego making 
local reductions if they purchase extra reductions made elsewhere 
instead.  Given this option, polluters facing relatively high marginal 
control costs will purchase relatively cheap credits reflecting non-local 
reductions, while those enjoying relatively low marginal control costs 
will make reductions at their own facilities and even make excess 
reductions there in order to generate saleable credits.41  The pollution 
sources themselves rearrange their pollution reduction obligations 
through trading to reach cost effective outcomes.42  Since facility owners 
have superior information about their own facilities’ pollution control 
technological possibilities and costs, this rearrangement manages cost 
effective fine-tuning much more efficiently than a regulator could. 
 The person most often credited with originating the emissions 
trading idea, the Canadian economist J.H. Dales, saw it as a way for 
economists to usefully improve environmental law’s efficiency without 
addressing its goals.43  He wrote about trading, because economics, in his 
view, had little useful to say about caps.44  Of course, the economic 
concept of allocatively efficient (sometimes called optimal) pollution 
levels does imply a method for setting capsestablishing pollution 
limits at the level where marginal cost equals marginal benefit.45  Dales’ 
seminal work on trading, however, opined that an economist “is quite 
unable to draw up a neat table” setting out an environmental regulation’s 
                                                
40 See POLLUTION FOR SALE, supra note 34, at 3 (contrasting cost effective abatement 
through trading with the regulator’s inability to obtain the information necessary to 
realize a cost effective solution himself).  
41 See James J. Winebrake et al., The Clean Air Act’s Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Market:  
Estimating the Costs of Regulatory and Legislative Intervention, 17 RESOURCE & 
ENERGY ECON. 239, 242 (1995) (explaining that plants with lower marginal abatement 
costs will make extra reductions and “sell their excess allowances for a profit,” while 
those with high marginal abatement costs will buy these allowances).  
42 See id. at 243 (formally demonstrating the cost savings); Swift, supra note 13, at 315 
(stating that trading lowers compliance costs by “allowing firms to reduce emissions at 
the generating units where their costs are lowest”). 
43 See Keohane, supra note 1, at 42 (describing emissions trading as “first proposed by 
Dales”); MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR:  THE U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM 3 (Denny Ellerman 
et al. eds., 2000) (attributing the insight that tradable permits would reduce pollution at 
least cost to Dales). 
44 See Lisa Heinzerling, Selling Pollution, Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 
302-303 (1995) (pointing out that Dales and other economists supporting trading 
“eschewed cost-benefit analysis . . . and left the choice of an environmental standard to 
politicians”).  
45 See generally WILLIAM BAXTER, PEOPLE OR PENGUINS:  THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL 
POLLUTION (1974); 
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costs and benefits, principally because of the difficulty of estimating and 
monetizing regulation’s environmental benefits.46   
 Dales’ work led to a vast economic literature on emissions 
trading that said little or nothing about setting caps, focusing instead on 
the effects of allowing trading. This literature models trading’s cost 
saving potential under various market structures and its effect on 
innovation.  But economics generally separated means and ends pretty 
neatly.47 
 In the late 1980’s Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart 
produced a landmark article on emissions trading that said more about 
caps than most of the economics literature had, as one might expect from 
a work by law professors.48 This seminal article draws out an implication 
of Dale’s approach that 1980s enthusiasm for economic efficiency had 
tended to obscure; trading could increase the efficiency of achieving any 
environmental goal, no matter how the goal was established.49  
Regulators can, in principle, decouple trading from CBA and use trading 
to pursue goals other than setting allocatively efficient pollution levels.50  
They made this claim in response to an article by Howard Latin, who 
opposed CBA as an example of the impracticality of pursuing 
theoretically perfect efficiency.51 
 Ackerman and Stewart subsequently styled their thesis “The 
Democratic Case for Emissions Trading,” pointing out that we could 
couple democratic goal setting with efficient achievement of a goal 
                                                
46 See J.H. DALES, POLLUTION PROPERTY AND PRICES:  AN ESSAY IN POLICY-MAKING 
AND ECONOMICS 39 (1968). 
47 Economists did address the relationship between means and ends in work asking 
whether the initial allocation of allowances affected a trading program’s efficiency.  
Their conclusion that allocation does not influence a program’s efficiency under 
standard assumptions affirms the separation of means and ends.  See Keohane, supra 
note 1, at 43 (pointing out that regardless of how allowances are “initially allocated” 
trading will produce the same equilibrium price); D.W. Montgomery, Markets in 
Licenses and Efficient Pollution Control Programs, 5 J. ECON. THEORY 395 (1972) 
(showing that in a perfectly functioning allowance market allocation method does not 
influence emission trading’s efficiency); cf. Frank Gagelman, The Influence of the 
Allocation Method on Market Liquidity, Volatility and Firms’ Investment Decisions, in 
INSTITUTIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING, supra note 9, at 69, 72 (explaining that under less 
than ideal market conditions, allocation method can influence trading’s efficiency).  
48 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1351-1364 (recommending a variety of 
reforms in establishing goals). 
49 See id. at 1352-53 (pointing out that their trading proposal is based on “allowable 
pollution loads prevailing under existing law” but calling for a system based on public 
debate on the question of how much pollution to allow). 
50 See id. (repudiating cost-benefit analysis while supporting trading). 
51 See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency:  Implementation of 
Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 
1269-70 (1985) (mentioning cost-benefit analysis as an example of regulatory “fine 
tuning” that “reflects an excessive preoccupation with theoretical efficiency” and 
“inadequate emphasis on actual . . . implementation constraints”). 
11 
August 26, 2009 Capping Carbon 
through emissions trading.52  They argue that EPA could establish a cap 
for an emissions trading program by determining how much pollution is 
allowable in a relevant airshed or watershed under existing law.53  But 
they argue that Congress, rather than EPA, should set the cap, thereby 
suggesting an ad hoc approach to goal setting, one unguided by any 
particular normative commitment.54 
 While Ackerman and Stewart’s title focuses on marrying 
economic efficiency and democratic cap setting, their article is perhaps 
best known for arguing that emissions trading is easier to establish than 
traditional BAT regulation.55  This argument, of course, assumes that 
emissions trading is different from BAT, an assumption that I will 
question.  Ackerman and Stewart claim that trading avoids BAT’s 
defects.56  A core defect involves the painstaking pace of regulation.  
They point out that BAT demands that regulators evaluate the 
performance and costs of multiple types of technology in order to set 
emissions limits, i.e. to establish caps.57  They describe the information 
burden of this technological evaluation as overwhelming.58  They explain 
that this “massive information-gathering” task generates “massive 
                                                
52 See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The 
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988); 
Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1353 (describing cap setting as “the 
quintessentially political question that should be answered by the legislative process”) 
(emphasis in original).  
53 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1347 (describing the regulator’s task as 
“estimating the total allowable wasteload permitted under existing law in each 
watershed or air control region.”).  
54 See id. at 1353 (calling for a Congressional decision about the cap and describing 
such a decision as political).   Ackerman and Stewart, however, characterize this as a 
first-generation reform and go on to support a second-generation reform, in which 
“Congress would create a statutory foundation for legally constrained cost-effectiveness 
analysis.”  Id. at 1355.  This cost effectiveness analysis focuses on allocating a fixed 
aggregate percentage reduction so that more of the reductions came from areas with 
more serious environmental problems.  See id.   They also envision this sort of analysis 
supporting better priority setting, apparently by EPA.  See id. at 1359-64.  This second-
generation proposal apparently makes secondary goal setting better informed and 
somewhat flexible.  But this stops short of establishing the normative principles that 
should guide initial goal setting.  
55 See id. at 1346 (claiming that trading offers “formidable administrative” advantages). 
56 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 52, at 179 (claiming that “allowing polluters to 
buy and sell each other’s permits . . .” cures many of “command-and-control 
regulation’s basic defects); see also Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. 
REV. 86, 101-102, 105-06 (1986) (characterizing “command and control” defects as 
pathologies and offering tradable pollution rights as a cure).   
57 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1336-37 (stating that BAT involves 
“complex scientific, engineering, and economic issues regarding the feasibility of 
controls on hundreds of thousands of pollution sources”). 
58 Id. at 1342 (characterizing BAT as generating “information-processing tasks” that 
overwhelm regulators). 
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adversary rulemaking proceedings and protracted judicial review” 
leading to substantial delay.59  Furthermore, they cite the difficulty of 
updating BAT limits in the face of these administrative burdens as a 
major problem.60  They also decry BAT for imposing “more stringent 
controls” on new sources then on existing sources,61 which presumably 
discourages introduction of cleaner newer technology.62  
 They argue that a cap-and-trade system eliminates the need for 
bureaucrats to engage in “economic and technological assessment” and 
“greatly reduces litigation and delay.”63  They further argue that trading 
somehow “eliminate[s] the disproportionate burdens that BAT imposes 
on new . . .industries.”64  For all of these reasons, and more, they claim 
that trading offers not only economic, but also administrative and 
environmental advantages.65   
              
 3. Emissions Trading in U.S. Law: Aggregate and Individual 
Caps—Ackerman and Stewart proved prescient in arguing for trading’s 
practicality and legislative cap setting.66  EPA had begun to experiment 
with a form of trading called bubbles in the late 1970s and began to 
expand this approach in the 1980s.67  Under this approach, States would 
impose individual caps on pollution sources, but allow owners of those 
sources to forego compliance if they made extra emission reductions 
elsewhere.68  The bubble programs generated significant cost savings, 
but did not perform adequately in protecting environmental quality, 
                                                
59 Id. at 1337, 1345-46. 
60 Id. at 1349. 
61 Id. at 1335-36.  
62 Cf. Richard Revesz & Jonathan Nash, Grandfathering and Environmental 
Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
1677 (2007) (explaining how new source review may apply to existing sources). 
63 Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1343-44, 1346 (describing trading as an 
alternative to “giving the job of economic and technological assessment to bureaucrats” 
who must defend these assessments in court). 
64 Id. at 1342. 
65 See id. at 1351.  My summary of this argument focuses on the aspects of Ackerman 
and Stewart’s work most germane to my effort to improve cap setting.     
66 Cf. Heinzerling, supra note 44, at 323 (arguing that in spite of the legislative cap 
setting Congress did not engage in the sort of deliberative discussion of goals 
Ackerman, Stewart, and others had hoped for). 
67 See RICHARD A. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION:  THE TOIL AND 
TROUBLE OF EPA’S BUBBLE (1986); RICHARD A. LIROFF, AIR POLLUTION OFFSETS:  
TRADING SELLING AND BANKING (1980). 
68 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 312 (explaining that bubble programs allowed pollution 
sources to escape unit-specific constraints and construction bans “in exchange for 
claimed reductions elsewhere”). 
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thereby fueling arguments against trading’s practicality.69  Title IV of the 
1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act,70 however, inaugurated the first 
major success with emissions trading, the acid rain trading program, 
showing that a properly designed trading program could, as Ackerman 
and Stewart had argued, deliver the environmental goods.71  Congress 
established an aggregate goal for electric utilities’ sulfur dioxide 
emissions expressed in tons of reduction below a baseline.72  This 
aggregate cap alone, however, would not tell an individual facility owner 
anything about how much reduction her firm must make or pay for 
elsewhere.73  Accordingly, Congress, in a detailed table in the legislation, 
established the number of allowances allocated to each regulated unit in 
the electricity industry.74  These individual caps imposed concrete 
obligations on power plant owners to reduce emissions by a particular 
amount.75  Another Title IV provision authorizes the facility owners to 
forego the local reductions otherwise required to meet their individual 
caps if they purchase sufficient allowances from overcomplying utilities 
to make up for the foregone local reductions.76    
 The creation of an aggregate cap adequate to ensure significant 
progress in addressing acid rain and the translation of this societal 
obligation into a concrete obligation for each regulated facility proved 
essential to the acid rain program’s success.77  While the literature often 
refers to this translation as the allocation of allowances, I have referred 
to it as the establishment of individual caps, because government trading 
                                                
69 See id. at 314-16 & nn.120-27 (documenting bubbles’ environmental failure); see 
generally POLLUTION FOR SALE, supra note 34, at 31 (describing the experience with 
emissions trading prior to 1990 as “not . . . particularly encouraging.”).   
70 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o. 
71 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 317-19; Swift, supra note 13, at 315 (pointing out that 
many regard the acid rain program “as one of the most successful environmental 
programs.”).  Cf. McAllister, supra note 11, at 103 (claiming that the acid rain program 
suffered from an “early overallocation” of allowances, compromising its environmental 
effectiveness).  
72 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b) (describing the title’s purpose as realizing a ten million ton 
reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions below a 1980 baseline). 
73 See Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, The Political Economy of Market-Based 
Environmental Policy:  The U.S. Acid Rain Program, 14 J. L. & ECON. 37, 41 (1998) 
(describing the acid rain program as establishing an “aggregate cap” on sulfur dioxide 
emissions). 
74 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(e)(3).  This table describes phase one reductions.  The statute 
provides a table for some emission units in phase two supplemented by numerical 
formulas specifying phase two allowances for most facilities.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7651d.   
75 See Dallas Burtraw, The SO2 Emissions Trading Program:  Cost Savings Without 
Allowance Trades, 14 CONTEMP. POL’Y 79, 80 (1996) (pointing out that the acid rain 
program establishes performance standards).   
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b),(g) (authorizing allowance transfers but prohibiting 
emissions in excess of allowances held). 
77 See generally EU ALLOCATION, supra note 4, at 18 (describing allocation as the 
decision about the number of allowances given to “each individual installation.”) 
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programs sometimes establish individual limits that facility owners must 
meet through either local pollution control or credit purchases by 
allocation of an explicit aggregate cap among sources (as in the acid rain 
program) and sometimes directly without any explicit prior decision 
about the total number of allowances (as in the bubble programs).  In 
both cases, however, the individual cap provides the pollution source 
with the information it needs to proceed with local reductions or 
purchase of allowances on the open market.78  Congress could establish 
individual caps in the acid rain legislation itself because regulators had a 
fuller understanding of this particular industry than perhaps any other, 
since utilities’ emissions have made them exceptionally important targets 
for federal air pollution regulation since the modern federal Clean Air 
Act’s advent in 1970.79   
 
B.  Emissions Trading to Address Climate Disruption 
 Shortly after the acid rain program became law, delegates from 
around the world met in Rio de Janeiro to address a new environmental 
problem, global climate disruption.80  The United States advanced what 
might be called a no-cap-but-trade approach.  The United States favored 
a new animal, international emissions trading, as a method for 
addressing global climate disruption,81 but it opposed capping the 
greenhouse gas emissions causing the climate disruption82.    
                                                
78 See POLLUTION FOR SALE, supra note 34, at 351 (likening allocation of permits to the 
setting of targets). 
79 See generally MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR, supra note 43, 13-39 (discussing the 
intensive work on addressing utility emissions over two decades prior to 1990 and the 
rich data EPA generated to aid in allocation).   
80 See generally Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change:  A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451 (1993) (describing the 
background to this meeting and analyzing the resulting framework convention).    
81 See Atle C. Christiansen & Jorgen Wettestad, The EU as a Frontrunner on 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading:  How Did it Happen and Will the EU Succeed, 3 
CLIMATE POL’Y 3, 4 (2003) (describing the U.S. as emissions trading’s main proponent 
during the 1990s); David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?:  The Emissions 
Trading Idea and the Climate Change Convention, 26 BOST. COLL. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 1, 3 (1998) (characterizing international emissions trading as a “centerpiece” of 
U.S. climate change policy). 
82 See Bodansky, supra note 80, at 468, 475, 490-91 (describing the Framework 
Convention’s “aim” of stabilizing emissions at 1990 levels as a compromise arrived at 
in response to U.S. opposition to binding emission limits); James A. Beard, An 
Application of the Principles of Sustainability to the Problem of Global Climate 
Change:  An Argument for Integrated Energy Services, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 191, 
203 (1996) (discussing successful U.S. efforts to defeat a proposal to reduce emissions 
by 20%). 
15 
August 26, 2009 Capping Carbon 
 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(Framework Convention)83 reflected reluctant international adoption of 
the U.S. position.  It embraced an aim, rather than a concrete 
requirement, to return developed country emissions to 1990 levels by the 
year 2000 and it provided that countries could achieve this aim 
“individually or jointly.”84  This reference to “joint implementation” 
reflected some acceptance of a trading approach, where a country could 
achieve this aim without reducing its own emissions fully to 1990 levels 
if it paid foreign countries or polluters to reduce their emissions by an 
amount sufficient to make up for the national emission reduction gap.85 
 Subsequently, U.S. support for emissions trading played an 
important role in the Kyoto Protocol’s formulation.  The United States 
nearly scuttled the agreement by opposing ambitious caps on national 
emissions and supporting trading.86  At the last minute, then Vice-
President Al Gore brokered a compromise under which the United States 
accepted a greenhouse gas emission reduction requirement, i.e. a national 
cap, in exchange for acceptance of broad trading.87  The resulting Kyoto 
Protocol authorizes no less than three international emissions trading 
programs, but also caps national greenhouse gas emissions in developed 
countries.88 These national caps, like the aggregate caps for an industry 
mentioned earlier, do not create individual caps.  They serve as goals for 
national programs to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, rather than as 
operative directives that governments or citizens can enforce against 
polluters. 
 The United States under President George W. Bush famously 
repudiated the Kyoto Protocol.89  So, the federal government of the 
United States established neither caps nor significant trading under 
President Bush.   
 The European Union (EU), which had been quite reluctant to 
embrace emissions trading, created the most important greenhouse gas 
                                                
83 Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework 
Convention on Climate Change on the Work of the Second Part of the Fifth Session, 
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development:  Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, 5th Sess., pt. 2, Annex 1,May 29, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 
(1992), 31 I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter FCCC].   
84 Id. art. 4(2)(b).  See Bodansky, supra note 80, at 515-17 (describing this clause as 
establishing a “quasi-target”). 
85 See Driesen, supra note 81, at 28 (explaining that the Framework Convention’s joint 
implementation provision could be interpreted to authorize trading). 
86 See POLLUTION FOR SALE, supra note 34, at 366 (explaining that the United States 
offer to return its emissions to 1990 levels by 2008-2012 instead of cutting them while 
strongly supporting trading excited outrage from the EU). 
87 See Driesen, supra note 81, at 20 (discussing Al Gore’s role). 
88 See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8, arts. 6(1)(d), 12(3)(b), 17, Annex B. 
89 Christiansen & Wettestad, supra note 81, at 6 (referring to President Bush’s 
“repudiation” of the Kyoto Protocol). 
16 
August 26, 2009 Capping Carbon 
emissions trading program in the world, the EU Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS), as the Kyoto Protocol entered into force.90  A EU 
directive establishes the trading mechanism and specifies which 
industries it will regulate.91   
 The EU Directive itself, however, does not establish aggregate or 
individual caps.  Instead, it delegates that task to member states, albeit 
under European Commission supervision.92  It requires the member 
states to regulate in two phases, with a first phase caps governed 
potential reductions from 2005-2007 and a second phase caps governing 
reductions from 2008-2012.93  These caps have often proven inadequate, 
producing conflict between the Commission and various member states94 
                                                
90 See Harro van Asselt, supra note 11, at 124 (describing the EU as “skeptical” about 
emissions trading “throughout the Kyoto Protocol negotiations”); Joseph Sarkis & 
Maury Tamarkin, Real Options for Renewable Energy Technologies in a GHG 
Emissions Trading Environment, in INSTITUTIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING, supra note 9, 
at 104, 106 (discussing the EU’s preference for ecotaxes); Claudia Kettner et.  al., 
Stringency and Distribution in the EU Emissions Trading SchemeThe 2005 Evidence  
1-2 (2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=968418 (explaining that serious discussion of an 
EU emissions trading scheme began in 2000 and that the EU enacted a Directive 
establishing the scheme in 2003) 
91 See EU Directive, supra note 6. 
92 See id. Annex III; Kettner et al., supra note 90, at 2 (explaining that “each Member 
State decides” on the total number of allowances to allocate to installations using 
European Commission guidelines).  
93 See McAllister, supra note 11, at 112. 
94 See Karoline Rogge, Joachim Schleich, & Regina Betz, An Early Assessment of 
National Allocation Plans for Phase 2 of EU Emissions Trading, Working Paper 
Sustainability and Innovation S1/2006 18, 36 (2006) (finding that the caps “will not 
require significant reductions” because of a 20 to 30% allowance overallocation); 
Kettner, supra note 90, at 14-15 (concluding that allowance allocations within the EU 
exceeded actual emissions and finding it “unlikely” that it provided any incentives for 
abatement in 2005); see e.g., Case T 278/05, United Kingdom v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. 
II-4807, 4830-31 (adjudicating a dispute about whether the European Commission 
could prohibit the United Kingdom from amending its national allocation plan (NAP) to 
allow for emission increases); Case T-374/04, Germany v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-
4431, 4493-94 (adjudicating a dispute about whether the European Commission 
properly limited Germany’s provision for ex-post adjustment of its NAP); Application, 
Case T-499/07, Bulgaria v. Comm’n, 2008 O.J. (C 64) 50-51 (seeking review of 
European Commission’s disapproval of Bulgaria’s phase II NAP); Application, Case T-
484/07, Romania v. Comm’n, 2008 O.J. (C 51) 57 (seeking review of European 
Commissions disapproval of Romania’s phase II NAP); Application, Case T-368/07, 
Lithuania v. Comm’n, 2007 O.J. (C283) 35-36 (seeking review of a European 
Commission decision about Lithuania’s NAP); Application, Case T-369/07, Latvia v. 
Commission, 2007 O.J. (C 269) 66-67 (seeking annulment of European Commission 
decision on Latvia’s NAP); Application, Case T-263/07, Estonia v. Comm’n, 2007 O.J. 
(C223) 12 (seeking annulment of European Commission decision on Estonia’s NAP); 
Application, Case T-221/07, Hungary v Comm’n, 2007 O.J. (C 199) 41 (contesting a 
European Commission decision on Hungary’s NAP); Application, Case T-194/07, 
Czech Republic v Comm’n, 2007 O.J. (C 199) 38-39 (seeking annulment of European 
Commission decision on the Czech Republic’s NAP); Application, Case T-183/07, 
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and contributing to the apparent failure of many member states to 
achieve Kyoto targets.95  The literature often refers to these government-
established individual caps as a type of grandfathering, because facility 
owners emitting pollution prior to the program’s enactment can continue 
polluting to some degree without paying for allowances after the cap is 
set.96  Thus, the EU followed the grandfathering approach of the acid 
rain program, which also relied on government setting of individual 
caps.97     
 Meanwhile, alarm grew within the United States about the federal 
government’s inaction in the face of mounting evidence of serious 
climate disruption flowing from excess greenhouse gas emissions.  A 
group of northeastern states decided to address this problem by adopting 
a “Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative” (RGGI), a cap-and-trade 
program regulating electric utility emissions in the northeast.98  This 
program establishes aggregate targets for individual states’ utility 
emissions in a regional agreement.99  But this program does not depend 
on government setting individual targets for its electric utility generating 
units, as the acid rain program and the EU ETS did.  Instead, the 
“Regional Organization” RGGI establishes generally auctions off 
allowances, limited in amount by the aggregate cap, to the highest 
bidder.100  Under this approach, polluters in effect establish their own 
                                                                                                                   
Poland v. Comm’n, 2007 O.J. (C 155) 41-42 (seeking annulment of a European 
Commission decision on Poland’s phase II NAP); Application, Case T-32/07, Slovakia 
v Comm’n, 2007 O.J. (C 69) 29 (contesting a European Commission decision on 
Slovakia’s NAP); Case C-127/07, Arcelor Atlantique and Lorraine and Others, 2007 
ECJ CELEX 127 ¶¶ 72-74 (Dec. 16, 2008) (upholding French law implementing EU’s 
emissions trading scheme).  
95 See Rogge, Schleich & Betz, supra note 94, at 6 (noting that only two member states 
met the EU’s deadline for submission of phase II caps). 
96 The literature traditionally distinguishes grandfathering, defined as a system that 
allocates allowances for free, from an auction-based allocation where polluters must 
pay for each allowances.  But some of the recent literature on the EU ETS implicitly 
employs a narrower definition of grandfathering. This literature subdivides giveaways 
of allowances into a “benchmarking” approach, where the amount given away 
corresponds to a BAT or BAT-related benchmark, and “grandfathering,” where the 
amount of allowances given away equals or nearly equals the amount of current 
emissions.  See, e.g., Rogge, Schleich, & Betz, supra note 94, at 22-23 (defining 
grandfathering as a program based on emissions in a recent base period and contrasting 
this with “benchmarking”).  This article employs the term grandfathering in the broader 
sense, as a general description of all systems that give away, rather than sell, 
allowances to polluters. 
97 See EU ALLOCATION, supra note 4, at 14-15 (noting that the EU Directive requires 
member states to allocate at least 95% of the allowances free of charge in the first 
trading period). 
98 See RGGI MOU, supra note 7. 
99 Id. § 2(c). 
100 See Keohane, supra note 1, at 47 (stating that “nearly all allowances” have been 
auctioned under the RGGI program); Richard Cowart, Carbon Caps and Efficiency 
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caps, rather than depend on government regulators to establish individual 
caps.101  To see this point, imagine a utility emitting 100 tons of carbon 
dioxide (the principal greenhouse gas).  A limited supply of allowances 
becomes available for purchase.  If the polluter purchases 90 tons of 
allowances from the government at auction, it must reduce its emissions 
by 10 tons or pay somebody else for 10 tons of allowances (reflecting 10 
tons of non-required reduction elsewhere).  If the polluter instead 
purchases 100 tons of allowances, it may keep its emissions at current 
levels.  If the polluter purchases 110 tons of allowances, it may increase 
its emissions to accommodate increased production.  The aggregate cap, 
however, provides a real constraint because it limits the total number of 
allowances the regulator can sell.  As long as a well-enforced provision 
prohibits all emissions not covered by allowances, this approach imposes 
a real cap on emissions. 
 This juxtaposition of the RGGI program’s auction system with 
the EU grandfathering system establishes an important conceptual point.  
Grandfathering implies what we might call “government individual cap 
setting,” requiring governments to set caps for individual facilities.   This 
can take the form of either legislative cap setting, as in the acid rain 
program, or administrative cap setting, a much more frequently used 
procedure where an administrative agency establishes an individual cap. 
By contrast, auctioning produces “market-based individual cap setting,” 
where the auction market translates a previously determined aggregate 
cap into individual caps.   
 The RGGI program inaugurated a trend toward greater reliance 
on market-based individual cap setting. In April of 2009, the EU adopted 
a proposal to make auctioning the “basic principle” for allocating 
allowances in a third phase of the ETS, which should take effect after 
2012.102  With some potentially significant exceptions, this 2009 
Amendment to the EU ETS envisions full auctioning in the power sector 
beginning in 2013, a response to large windfall profits in that sector 
under grandfathering, and a phase in of full auctioning for other sectors 
by 2027.103  Auctions have also emerged as a prominent issue in the 
                                                                                                                   
Resources:  How Climate Legislation Can Mobilize Efficiency and Lower the Cost of 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Reductions, 33 VT.  L. REV. 201, 218 (2008) (reporting 
auctioning of 90% of allowances); Daniel P. Schramm, A Federal Midwife: Assisting 
the States in the Birth of a Nat’l Greenhouse Gas Cap-And-Trade Program, 22 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 61, 68 (2008) (discussing the Regional Organization’s role). 
101 Gagelman, supra note 47, at 71 (explaining that under auctioning “participants 
themselves determine their individual allocation”). 
102 See 2009 EU Amendments, supra note 21, preamble (15). 
103 See id. preamble (19),(21),(25); GAO, PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON OPTIONS 
FOR DISTRIBUTING EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES AND REVENUE UNDER A CAP-AND-TRADE 
PROGRAM 8 (2009) (noting that European electric utilities receiving free allowances 
“reaped substantial” windfall profits).    
19 
August 26, 2009 Capping Carbon 
Congressional discussion of federal cap-and-trade systems for the United 
States.  While the Cap and Dividend Act of 2009104 immediately moves 
to full auctioning, the bills that have garnered significant political 
support so far phase-in auctions over time like the EU’s 2009 
legislation.105  Thus, while a trend toward auctioning has developed, 
governments have moved toward auctioning incompletely and, with the 
exception of the RGGI states, very slowly.      
 Those involved in establishing trading programs must confront 
crucial questions about how to establish caps.  This part has already 
provided basic background, establishes the concepts of aggregate and 
individual caps, and distinguished government (both legislative and 
administrative) from market-based individual cap setting.  The next part 
discusses the approaches governments employ to determine a cap’s 
level—the amount of pollution to allow. 
 
II.  SETTING CAPS 
 This section will first discuss possible ways of setting caps and 
their implications, thus providing an analytical predicate for the 
normative analysis in part III.  It will then describe some of the history of 
cap setting to show how governments have established caps for 
emissions trading programs.  This history establishes that trading often 
functions as a form of BAT, rather than as a means of escaping its 
environmental defects.   
 
A.  Possible Ways of Setting Caps 
 In principle, regulators establishing caps face the same basic 
choices whether they allow trading or not.  A key choice involves the 
costs’ role.  Sometimes regulators basically ignore costs in setting 
standards.  While this is less common than many observers assume, it is 
conceptually important both generally and in the climate disruption 
context.  The principle example of cost blind regulation involves setting 
                                                
104 Cap and Dividend Act of 2009, H.R. 1862, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9903 (2009). 
105 See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, GREENHOUSE GAS LEGISLATION:  
SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF H.R. 2454 AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 7-8 
(2009) (showing that Waxman-Markey authorizes auction of 16% of the allowances in 
2016 and 65% in 2030); LARRY PARKER AND BRENT YACOBUCCI, CRS REPORT FOR 
CONGRESS:  CLIMATE CHANGE: COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF S. 1766 AND S. 2191 
(S.3036) 2, 5 (2008) (describing the increase in percentage of auctioned allowances in 
two major Senate bills introduced in the 110th Congress).  Cf. LARRY PARKER, BRENT 
D. YACOBUCCI, & JONATHEN L. RAMSEUR, CRS REPORT TO CONGRESS:  GREENHOUSE 
GAS REDUCTION:  CAP-AND-TRADE BILLS IN THE 110TH CONGRESS 9-10 (2008) 
(describing some bills as delegating auctioning authority to EPA or the President with 
others phasing in auctions with varying degrees of completeness over time).  
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national ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act.  Because, 
the Clean Air Act requires that these standards protect public health, the 
Supreme Court has held that EPA may not consider cost in establishing 
these standards.106   
 National ambient air quality standards exemplify what 
environmental lawyers commonly call effects-based standards, standards 
aimed at protecting the public from environmental or health effects 
deemed unacceptable.107  In principle, a government can establish a cap 
for an emissions trading program in the same way.  Indeed, Ackerman 
and Stewart’s suggestion that EPA establish caps based on the amount of 
pollution allowed in an airshed or watershed under existing law implies 
effects-based caps, as both the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts use 
effects-based approaches to determining total permissible pollution 
loadings.108   
 Traditionally, however, environmental law has relied heavily 
upon standard setting that does consider cost in some fashion.  Anytime, 
a regulator considers cost, she must consider technology, directly or 
indirectly.109  The cost of making any environmental improvement 
equals the cost of the technological changes needed to realize that 
improvement.110  Thus, it is impossible to responsibly consider costs 
without doing that which Ackerman and Stewart would like to avoid, 
evaluating technology. 
 Generally economists and regulators constructing cost estimates 
of trading programs have relied on estimates of the cost of various 
technological options.111  Recently, economists have used this “bottom-
                                                
106 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001)  (holding that 
section 109(b) “unambiguously bars” consideration of cost in setting national ambient 
air quality standards). 
107 See DAVID M. DRIESEN & ROBERT W. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:  A 
CONCEPTUAL AND PRAGMATIC APPROACH 135-152 (2007) (describing the concept of 
effects-based standards and using national ambient air quality standards as examples). 
108 See id. at 143-162, 471-485 (explaining the major requirements for establishing and 
implementing effects-based standards for air and water quality); Ackerman & Stewart, 
supra note 17, at 1347.  
109 See Driesen, supra note 36, at 49-50 (explaining in detail why cost estimation 
requires technological assessment). 
110 Accord MITIGATION, supra note 16, at 147 (noting that “the cost . . . of any response 
to climate change” depends “critically on the cost, performance, and availability of 
technologies that can lower emissions.”). 
111 See, e.g., Nathaniel O. Keohane, Cost Savings from Allowance Trading in the 1990 
Clean Air Act:  Estimates from a Choice-Based Model, in  MOVING TO MARKETS IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:  LESSONS FROM TWENTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE 194, 
195 (Charles Kolstad & Jody Bernstein eds., 2007)  [hereinafter MOVING TO MARKETS] 
(discussing cost estimation’s dependence on data about scrubber and coal costs); Curtis 
Carlson et al., Sulfur Dioxide Control by Electric Utilities:  What are the Gains from 
Trade?, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1292, 1293-94 (2000) (estimating the costs of the acid  rain 
program requires assessment of the cost of fuel switching and employing scrubbers 
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up” approach to evaluate the cost of addressing global climate 
disruption.112  This approach proves data intensive, because it requires 
estimates of the costs of particular technologies in a variety of 
industries.113   
 Some economists studying global climate disruption, however, 
have used a top-down approach to cost estimation, which appears to 
avoid this BAT problem.114  Under this approach, modelers rely on data 
about fuel price increases and simultaneous declining energy use to 
estimate correlations between fuel price increases and carbon dioxide 
reduction.115  This approach, however, often generates much higher cost 
estimates than bottom-up modeling.116  A top-down modeling approach 
based on energy prices does not apply to greenhouse gases other than 
carbon dioxide or to other environmental problems, because the data to 
support such an approach just does not exist.117  Economists increasingly 
blend top-down and bottom-up approaches, which means that recent 
modeling, even when it employs some top-down analysis, includes 
evaluation of particular technologies.118  Even in the case of greenhouse 
gases, cost estimation usually requires explicit consideration of 
                                                                                                                   
together with the computation of the “least cost solution” realizable through 
rearrangement of these technologies).  
112 See MITIGATION, supra note 110, at 8-9  (explaining the difference between bottom-
up and top-down economic models and summarizing some bottom-up modeling 
results). 
113 See id. at 8 (describing “bottom-up” studies as “based on assessment of mitigation 
options, emphasizing specific technologies and regulations.”); see, e.g., D.A. Hanson & 
J. A. Laitner, Technology Policy and World Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the Amigan 
Modeling System, ENERGY J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 355 (2006) (presenting a model 
characterizing as many as 200 sectors of various regional economies);  see also Marilyn 
A. Brown, Market Failures and Barriers as a Basis for Clean Energy Policies, 29 
ENERGY POL’Y 1197 (2001) (showing that consideration of how markets for energy 
efficient technologies actually work can provide a basis for specific policies to 
overcome barriers).   
114 See MITIGATION, supra note 110, at 8-10 (describing top-down modeling and 
summarizing some of its conclusions for climate change). 
115 See generally, id. at 8 (describing top-down studies as based on “aggregate 
information” and including “macro-economic and market feedbacks”). 
116 Cf. id. at 635 (noting that a previous assessment, called TAR, showed that top-down 
modeling generated higher costs than bottom-up models, but more recent top-down 
models assuming cost decreasing technological changes sometimes produced lower 
costs than bottom-up models). 
117 See John P. Weyant et al., Overview of EMF-21:  Multigas Mitigation and Climate 
Policy, THE ENERGY J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 6 (2006) (noting that “energy economics” 
provides no basis for estimating non-energy greenhouse gas emissions and that 
previous studies have not estimated the costs of reducing these emissions because of a 
“lack of data on engineering solutions”). 
118 See MITIGATION, supra note 110, at 8 (noting that top-down and bottom-up models 
have “become more similar” party because top-down models “have incorporated more 
technological mitigation options”). 
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technology and when it does not, it involves indirect consideration of 
technology, just as benchmarking does in establishing BAT.119  
 Ackerman and Stewart correctly identify a BAT approach as the 
dominant approach to traditional regulation.120 Regulators can, however, 
in principle use a BAT approach to establish a cap for a cap-and-trade 
program; i.e. they can establish the level of performance demanded by a 
cap-and-trade program by estimating the capabilities of the best available 
technology.121  Once regulators establish a BAT-based cap, however, 
they may allow owners of capped facilities to purchase allowances, 
rather than employ the technology on which the regulation is based, to 
meet the cap.  Therefore, BAT regulation is a theoretically available 
option for establishing a cap for a trading program.   
 While many scholars, including Ackerman, Stewart, and Dales, 
doubt the practicality of CBA, it became a frequently employed input to 
decisions about setting emission limits beginning the 1980s.122  It too, 
requires consideration of cost.  It therefore requires consideration of 
technology.   
 Each of these three approaches to setting cap— effects-based, 
cost-benefit based, and technology-based (BAT) approaches—have 
advantages and disadvantages.  Most environmental scholars find a BAT 
approach much simpler and more practical than the available 
alternatives.123  While engineering judgment about various technologies’ 
                                                
119 See, e.g., K. Casey Delhotal et al., Mitigation of Methane and Nitrous Oxide 
Emissions from Waste, Energy, and Industry, THE ENERGY J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 45, 46 
(2006) (explaining that the study estimates the costs of reductions from specific 
abatement technologies); Deborah Ottinger Schaefer et al., Estimating Future 
Emissions and Potential Reductions of HFCs, PFCs, and SF6, THE ENERGY J. (SPECIAL 
ISSUE) 63, 81 (2006) (explaining that its analysis includes cost and emission reduction 
information on 43 emission reduction technologies); Richard S.J. Tol, Multi-gas 
Emission Reduction for Climate Change Policy:  An Application of Fund, THE ENERGY 
J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 235, 238 (2006) (basing some of its cost analysis on EPA analysis). 
120 Accord Chris H. Schroeder, In the Regulation of Manmade Carcinogens, If 
Feasibility is the Answer, What is the Question?, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1496 (1990) 
(book review) (arguing that feasibility analysis has gained a “working hegemony in the 
world of practical administration”). 
121 See Driesen, supra note 36, at 18-19 (explaining that regulators could employ a 
“technology-based criterion to set the limits” underlying a trading program); accord 
McAllister, supra note 11, at 129-30 (agreeing that “in principle” regulators can use the 
feasibility principle to set a cap); see also Driesen, supra note 36, at 21 (using the Clean 
Water Act’s BAT standards as an example of a provision basically conforming to the 
feasibility principle). 
122 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1352 (rejecting considering all costs and 
benefits to calculate an optimal level of pollution as a “utopian scheme” insufficiently 
sensitive to “problems of limited information”); REFORMING REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS 20-162 (Winston Harrington et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter RIA] (detailing 
the role of CBA in several recently created emissions trading programs). 
123 See, e.g., Wendy A. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 83, 94-107 (arguing that BAT standards can be established expeditiously, 
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pollution reduction capabilities and costs introduces complexities, the 
difficulties appear minor compared to the alternatives.124   
An effects-based approach requires a regulator to carry out tasks 
so complicated that this approach has regularly failed in every medium, 
land, air, and water, as Oliver Houck has explained.125  For example, the 
Clean Water Act’s Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) program 
requires states to calculate an aggregate cap on water pollution for a 
watershed based on how much pollution can occur without jeopardizing 
beneficial uses of the water.126  The regulator then should, in principle, 
establish individual caps adding up to no more than the aggregate cap.127  
Houck explains that serious problems of incomplete information, 
guesswork, and therefore strife and contention plague every step of this 
exercise,128 as pollution loadings’ effects depend in part on waterflow 
characteristics and other natural conditions that can vary over time and 
space.129  Indeed, the failure of the effects-based approach employed in 
the 1960s induced Congress to switch the focus of the federal effort to 
address water pollution to a technology-based approach in 1972.130    
                                                                                                                   
enforced, and made both predictable and adaptable); Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, 
Administrative Incentives, and the Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1660-67 (1991) 
(explaining why BAT standards work better in practice than the alternatives); Sidney A. 
Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not so Paradoxical:  The Rationale for Technology-
Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L. J. 729. 
124 See Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. 
L. 119, 133-35 (2003) (finding that “the most common criticism of risk-based standards 
is that they do not work and providing examples of where they failed).  
125 See OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM:  LAW, POLICY, 
AND IMPLEMENTATION 136, 165, 194-97 (2002)  (making this assertion and providing 
examples); see also Babich, supra note 124, at 125 (finding that rational risk-based 
standard setting is “not possible”); Latin, supra note 51, at 1304-14 (summarizing 
EPA’s experience under a harm-based approach).  Cf. Amy Sinden, In Defense of 
Absolutes:  Combating the Politics of Power in Environmental Law, 90 IOWA L. REV. 
1405, 1488 (2005) (arguing that the strict effects-based approach in the Endangered 
Species Act produces results “closer to where we want to be” than a balancing approach 
would).  
126 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (requiring states to “establish . . . the total maximum 
daily load” of pollutants at the level “necessary to implement . . . water quality 
standards”).  
127 See HOUCK, supra note 127, at 5 (describing the Clean Water Act as expecting that 
states “would allocate” the TMDLs among discharge sources in discharge permits and 
state water quality plans). 
128 See id. at 49-64, 136-142 (describing how the TMDL process failed and emphasizing 
scientific uncertainty). 
129 See id. at 195 (noting that every water segment has its own “flow regime” and other 
natural conditions); POLLUTION FOR SALE, supra note 34, at 212 (explaining that 
variability in stream flow, temperature, and other natural factors makes it impossible to 
reliably link discharge amounts to water quality). 
130 See Weyerhaeuser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (recognizing 
that Congress adopted a technology-based approach in 1972 in reaction to the failed 
effort to “use receiving water quality as a basis for setting effluent standards”). 
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 CBA combines the complexity of technology-based cap setting 
with the complexity of effects-based cap setting, and then adds some 
additional difficult and controversial elements.131 The cost estimates 
depend on the same sorts of technological evaluations that Ackerman 
and Stewart find problematic.132  Estimating the benefits of particular 
levels of pollution reduction requires linking particular pollution loading 
levels to particular environmental outcomes, just as in a TMDL.  
Moreover, a cost-benefit approach requires regulators not only to figure 
out what cap will achieve adequate environmental or health protection, 
but also to quantitatively estimate the effects’ magnitude at various 
unsafe levels.  Finally, CBA requires a controversial effort to make 
dollar estimates of the value of various health and environmental 
improvements from a proposed cap.133  Even CBA’s staunchest 
defenders recognize that CBA in practice provides incomplete and 
unreliable benefits estimates, because of data gaps.134  In any case, CBA 
provides the most complicated possible method for establishing a cap, 
and in the climate disruption context, even some economists have begun 
to doubt its utility.135 
                                                
131 See David M. Driesen, Getting Our Priorities Straight:  One Strand of the 
Regulatory Reform Debate, 31 ENVTL.  L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10003, 10019 n. 204 
(2001) (explaining that CBA requires “consideration of almost all of the factors 
relevant to the technological feasibility inquiry, plus health and environmental factors 
that are” even more difficult to assess). 
132 Id. (explaining that “[i]n order to assess the cost of achieving a given level of 
pollution reduction, an agency must understand the technological options available” for 
meeting that level). 
133 See Christian Azar, Are Optimal CO2 Emissions Really Optimal?, 11 ENVTL. & 
RESOURCE ECON. 301, 304 (1998) (describing the techniques used to value “non-market 
impacts” as “controversial”). 
134 See, e.g., William D. Nordhaus, To Tax or Not to Tax:  Alternative Approaches to 
Slowing Global Warming, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 26, 31 (2007) (providing an 
estimate of the optimal carbon price, but conceding that this estimate does not “capture 
all the nonmarket aspects of global warming”); Keohane, supra note 1, at 48 (pointing 
out that economists’ incomplete “estimates of marginal damages vary by a factor of 
30”); RIA, supra note 122 (detailing the non-quantified impacts in cost-benefit analysis 
of three different rules limiting air pollution).  
135 See Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of 
Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 18 (2009) (finding that the 
uncertain probability and scope of climate change catastrophes makes CBA “much 
more frustrating and much more subjective” than usual); Frank Ackerman, Climate 
Change in Four Easy Pieces, 51 DEV. 325, 328-330 (2008) (finding CBA useless 
because it cannot monetize important benefits and its assumptions tend to exaggerate 
the costs of addressing climate change); Terry Barker, The Economics of Avoiding 
Dangerous Climate Change.  An Editorial Essay on the Stern Review, 89 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 173, 175 (2008) (stating that CBA may be “useless” for climate policy because 
of the uncertainty and risks of catastrophe); Hanson & Laitner, supra note 113, at 358 
(explaining that they “model[] for insights not for numbers,” because they consider all 
existing models highly uncertain and incomplete); NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1181 (2005) (characterizing quantifying and monetizing the “full 
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  A number of scholars find either effects-based standard setting or 
cost-benefit based standard setting more attractive normatively than 
BAT.  Perhaps the best defense of effects-based standards comes from 
“objectivist” theories in philosophy, which suggest that certain types of 
goods are fundamental, while others are not.136  That sort of 
philosophical perspective suggests that we should not sacrifice 
fundamental things for the sake of non-essentials, like increased 
consumption of luxury goods.  For example, adequate health is so 
important to people that just about everything else seems to pale in 
importance.  Cass Sunstein suggests that the goal of avoiding the 
elimination of a species from the earth might likewise find support in 
fundamental norms not susceptible to arguments about tradeoffs.137  This 
would suggest an effects-based approach simply demanding that we 
avoid loss of a species or unacceptable health problems.  The species 
loss argument for an effects-based approach applies to climate 
disruption, as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts 
that climate disruption may eliminate 20 to 30% of plant and animal 
species now in existence.138  I do not have space here to adequately 
examine the normative arguments for an effects-based approach.139 But 
                                                                                                                   
range” of climate change effects as “conceptually, ethically, and empirically very 
difficult”); Azar, supra note 133, at 303 (finding that lack of knowledge of probabilities 
and the magnitude of potential catastrophes create indeterminacy that “reduces the 
usefulness of cost-benefit analysis”);  see also Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, 
Cultural Transformation, and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. L. REV. 555, 
589-90 (2004) (explaining the scientific uncertainty and other factors imply that CBA  
“offers meager assistance to climate change policymaking”). 
136 See MATTHEW ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 31-32 (2006) (discussing objectivist theory as a potential objection to cost-
benefit analysis); Martha Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy:  Some Moral Limits of 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1021-22, 1026 (2000) (arguing for the 
primacy of good health and environmental protection as basic to life). 
137 See Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1697 
(2001) (suggesting that the Endangered Species Act might best be understood as 
“rooted in a theory of rights” with respect to irreversible losses); Cass Sunstein, 
Legislative Forward:  Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 247, 305-306 (1996) (linking the Endangered Species Act to 
democratically-chosen goals).  Accord Matthew Adler & Eric Posner, Rethinking Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L. J. 165, 245 (1999) (recognizing that the preservation of 
endangered species might have some non-welfarist intrinsic good not captured by 
CBA). 
138 See IMPACTS, supra note 15, at 213; J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change and the Endangered 
Species Act:  Building Bridges to the No-Analogy Future, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14-26 
(2008) (discussing how climate change threatens species). 
139 Cf. Sinden, supra note 125, at 1411 (arguing that strict effects-based standards help 
check corporate influence on environmental law). 
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the existence of rather absolutist goals in a number of statutes suggests 
that these goals may be normatively attractive in some contexts.140   
 By contrast, many scholars find CBA normatively appealing.  
Economists tend to favor economic efficiency as a goal.  They treat all 
good things, including good health and environmental quality, as 
fungible commodities and see the proper goal of regulation as 
establishing the appropriate allocation of societal resources among a 
large variety of competing goals based upon individual preferences.141  
Perhaps the most thoughtful normative defense of CBA comes from 
Matthew Adler and Eric Posner.142  While recognizing many of CBA’s 
weaknesses and doubting that all private preferences aptly measure 
value, they argue that “overall well-being” matters and that CBA 
approximates it better than other procedures.143  They remain open, 
however, to the possibility that “deontological considerations” may 
trump overall well-being in some situations.144  While rationales vary, 
several prominent scholars find economic efficiency or some similar 
concept attractive as a normative goal. 
 I have defended BAT regulation normatively on the grounds that 
it takes the distribution of costs and benefits into account in ways that 
reflect important and justifiable value choices.145 BAT regulation reflects 
a view that often rejects widespread plant closures as unacceptable, but 
otherwise privileges health, safety, and environmental protection over 
                                                
140 See, e.g., TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 151, 187 (1978) (declining to engage in “utilitarian 
calculations” in deciding whether the Endangered Species Act required the closure of a 
nearly completed dam because Congress viewed the value of endangered species as 
“incalculable”); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 457, 471 (2001) (holding 
that EPA must establish national ambient air quality standards that protect public health 
regardless of cost); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (establishing a goal of restoring the “chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters,” in part, through a subsidiary 
goal of eliminating all discharges of pollutants into waters). 
141 See, e.g., BAXTER, supra note 45 (explaining in detail why he thinks this perspective 
should guide environmental policy). 
142 See Amy Sinden, Douglas A. Kysar, & David M. Driesen, Cost-Benefit Analysis:  
New Foundations on Shifting Sands, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 48, 50 (2009) (book 
review) (characterizing Adler & Posner’s book as representing the most “ambitious and 
credible” effort to date to theoretically defend CBA). 
143 See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 136; Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, 
Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1106 (2000); Adler & Posner, supra note 137.  Cf. Sinden, Kysar, & Driesen, 
supra note 142. 
144 Adler & Posner, supra note 137, at 244-45 (noting that CBA does not include 
deontological and other “nonwelfarist” criteria, and recognizing that it therefore cannot 
be an “exclusive choice procedure.”); see also Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death, and 
Time:  A Comment on Judge William’s Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 53 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 271, 273 (2001) (raising questions about whether CBA is appropriate for 
regulations involving a risk of death). 
145 See Driesen, supra note 36, at 34-41 (describing and defending these value choices). 
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competing “goods.”146  This value choice may be justifiable, since job 
losses can undermine individual well-being in a very fundamental way 
that may justify putting plant closures on a par with health threats.147  
But I suggest that most material losses just do not matter much compared 
to the value of good health and an ecologically satisfactory 
environment.148   Hence, BAT may track our values reasonably well, 
perhaps better than CBA, which presupposes that no quality of life is 
truly fundamental.   
 This brief summary of normative and practical characteristics of 
cap-setting approaches does not provide a comprehensive theory of 
which approach is best, but it acquaints the reader with the predominant 
thinking in the field as a prelude to thinking about improving cap setting.  
This analysis does, however, help matters considerably by suggesting 
that cap-setting approaches involve tradeoffs between various normative 
and practical considerations.  I will argue, however, that sometimes the 
specifics of a situation can influence choices among these approaches 
and that the specifics of climate change may explain some of the 
unappreciated characteristics of cap setting.  Also, the fact that these 
basic approaches and all of their dilemmas continue to exist in the 
trading context has strangely escaped the notice of most scholars, 
probably because of the overwhelming force of the market metaphor and 
the interest in the trading that comes after a cap is set.149  So, this simple 
contribution of synthesizing some of the field’s best thinking about goal 
setting and explaining that this work does matter for cap setting in the 
trading context significantly improves our understanding of 
environmental law. 
 
B.  Cap Setting in Practice 
 Armed with an understanding of possible approaches to setting 
caps, we can now ask how regulators have set caps for trading programs.  
My main claim here is simple, that many trading programs can be 
characterized as forms of BAT regulation, rather than as means of 
escaping BAT’s alleged pathologies. 
                                                
146 Id. at 3 (describing the “feasibility principle” embodied in BAT as “reflecting a 
preference for avoiding widespread plant shutdowns” while maximizing protection of 
health where widespread shutdowns seem unlikely).  
147 See id. at 37 (describing plant closures as having a potentially “devastating impact 
on workers’ lives”). 
148 See id. at 36 (describing costs that are widely distributed as unlikely to have a 
meaningful impact on most people’s lives). 
149 Cf. McAllister, supra note 11, at 128-32 (comparing feasibility and cost-benefit 
approaches to cap setting and concluding that adoption of a cap-and-trade approach 
“does not avoid the classic policy questions of environmental law.”). 
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In making this claim, I have in mind a more technically accurate 
and narrower definition of a BAT standard than one sometimes sees in 
the literature.  Some scholars describe BAT standards (and their 
synonym, technology-based regulations) as dictating the use of a 
particular technology, characterizing BAT pejoratively as “command-
and-control regulation.”150  But traditional BAT standards outside the 
trading context most often take the form of performance standards, a 
requirement to meet an individualized cap, thereby allowing polluters to 
use technologies that the regulator did not necessarily contemplate.151  
While some BAT standards (so-called work practice standards) dictate 
technologies, others do not.152  In any case, trading avoids one problem 
sometimes associated with BAT standards, a lack of technological 
flexibility. 
 My claim about the implications of caps often constituting a form 
of BAT standards, while important, is fairly narrow:  Establishing a cap-
and-trade program does not necessarily relieve us from the difficulties 
associated with evaluating technologies and their costs, even for 
individual facilities, nor from lobbying and litigation aimed at relaxing 
caps.153 Whether it does so or not depends on the approach we take to 
cap setting.   
 1.  BAT Caps—The acid rain program probably appears to most 
scholars as a product of ad hoc democratic decision-making.  After all, 
Congress, not EPA, set the cap, demanding a ten million ton reduction in 
sulfur dioxide emissions below 1980 levels.154  This seems like an 
arbitrary number.  But it is not.   
                                                
150 See Sinden, supra note 4, at 550 (defining command-and-control regulation “in a 
strict sense” as regulation requiring specific measures, such as use of a specified 
pollution control technology); Dudek & Golub, supra note 28, at S24 (describing the 
BAT approach as a “requirement to use predetermined technology”). 
151 See Sinden, supra note 4, at 550; Carlson et al., supra note 111, at 1294 (pointing 
out that an emissions rate standard provides opportunities to “take advantage of 
technical change”); Driesen, supra note 2, at 297-98. 
152 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 297-98; see, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Harrison, 660 
F.2d 628, 636 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that performance standards must take the form of 
“emissions limitations based on output,  . . not . . . work practice. . . requirements”). 
153 See Anja Pauksztat & Martin Kruska, Product-Based Benchmarks as a Basis for 
Rational Use of Energy and Corporate Sustainability, in INSTITUTIONAL EMISSIONS 
TRADING, supra note 9, at 37, 40 (explaining that establishing a cap via a benchmark 
requires an information intensive assessment of the “technical potential” for carbon 
dioxide reductions at installations); EU ALLOCATION, supra note 4, at 28-34 (explaining 
that both dirty and clean producers lobbied for more allowances); SKJAERSETH & 
WETTESTAD, supra note  176, at 175-76 (discussing lobbying’s large negative impact 
and characterizing it as based on fear of rising abatement costs). 
154 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b).  Cf. Heinzerling, supra note 44, at 320 (noting that some of 
the ten million ton reduction below 1980 levels called for was achieved prior to the acid 
rain program’s enactment).  
29 
August 26, 2009 Capping Carbon 
 Regulators generally derived the final allowance levels in the 
acid rain program from an emissions limit established in a 1971 BAT-
type regulatory proceeding.  To be specific, the Clean Air Act requires 
major new sources to meet a New Source Performance Standard (NSPS), 
defined as an emissions standard “achievable through the application of 
the best system of emission reduction which [sic] . . . the [EPA] 
determines has been adequately demonstrated.”155  In 1971, EPA 
determined that coal-fired power plants could achieve an emissions rate 
of 1.2 pounds of sulfur dioxide emissions per million British Thermal 
Units of energy produced by using scrubbers or low sulfur coal, and set 
the NSPS at that level.156  The ten million ton reduction goal for sulfur 
dioxide emission reductions approximates the result of multiplying this 
technology-based emissions rate by the utilities’ baseline emissions.157  
In other words, the acid rain program’s cap is basically a BAT 
standard.158  While the acid rain program allows trading and therefore 
invites the use of technologies other than end-of-the-pipe controls, its 
cap, nevertheless, reflects the specific result of a bureaucratic 
investigation of technologies and their capabilities.159  And the cost 
projections made for the program prior to enactment likewise reflect the 
evaluation of the market costs of the technologies regulators thought 
utilities would have to rely on to meet the limits.160 
 More recently, EPA employed BAT to establish a trading 
program to aid state efforts to protect the public from ground level 
                                                
155 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). 
156 See 36 Fed. Reg. 24876, 24879 (December 23, 1971), codified at 40 C.F.R. § 
60.43(b) (1972); Edward S. Rubin et al., Experience Curves for Power Plant Emission 
Control Technologies, 2 INT. J. ENERGY TECH. & POL’Y 52, 54 (2004) (describing the 
first NSPS for coal-fired power plants as establishing a 1.2 pounds per million BTU 
standard as “BACT”); Swift, supra note 13, at 317 (claiming that meeting this NSPS 
required either scrubbers or “compliance coal” with low sulfur content).  
157 See McAllister, supra note 11, at 106 (describing the rate as the one “required for 
new coal fired plants . . under the [NSPS] program” and noting that the “basic formula” 
for phase two allocations multiplied this rate by baseline emissions);  see also 
MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR, supra note 43, at 44 (showing that some of the departures 
from the NSPS-based formula to create individual caps were based on “technical 
considerations” like those used to form technology-based standards).  Cf. Joskow & 
Schmalensee, supra note 73, at 55-66 (explaining that the allocation of individual 
allowances included a lot of special interest variations from the basic rule for setting 
allowances).   
158 See EU Allocation, supra note 4, at 353 (describing the 1.2 pounds per million Btu 
emissions rate as based on “the best available control technology”). 
159 See MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR, supra note 43, at 23 (describing the acid rain 
proposal as extending the 1970 Act’s NSPS emission rates to all existing generating 
units). 
160 See Carlson et al., supra note 111, at 1315 (explaining that EPA’s cost figures 
depended on estimates of the number of scrubbers deployed and price of  low sulfur 
coal). 
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ozone, a powerful lung irritant, and particulate matter, which is 
associated with tens of thousands of annual deaths in the United 
States.161  As the D.C. Circuit explained, EPA calculated the limits for 
the target pollutants by applying an emissions rate from “highly cost 
effective emissions controls” to the heat input from electric utility 
generating units.162  To be precise, EPA based its cap on flue gas 
desulfurization to control sulfur dioxide and selective catalytic reduction 
to control nitrogen dioxide.163 
 In a related rule, EPA developed a technology-based emissions 
trading program for mercury emissions under the very same NSPS 
provision that generated the emissions rate undergirding the acid rain 
program. 164 These standards reflected detailed study of the end-of-the-
pipe technologies available to control mercury, both in terms of 
performance and cost.165  And, like practically all administrative 
technology-based regulations, this one produced litigation challenging 
the standards.166 
 While the prevalence of BAT practices in setting caps for trading 
programs will surprise readers of the trading literature, a moment’s 
reflection suggests that BAT’s role in trading programs should not 
astonish well-informed environmental law scholars.  Regulators must 
have some basis (and if the regulator is an administrative agency, a 
legally defensible basis) for setting a cap.  Difficult as it may be to 
evaluate technologies and their costs, cap setting based on technological 
evaluation usually proves simpler than the alternatives.  Hence, Congress 
                                                
161 See North Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 , 903 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
162 Id. at 904 (internal quotations omitted). 
163 Nathaniel O. Keohane, The Technocratic and Democratic Functions of Regulatory 
Analysis:  The Case of the Clean Air Interstate Rule, in RIA, supra note 122, at 36, 39.  
164 See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing EPA’s 
mercury rule as establishing performance standards under section 111 and creating a 
“voluntary emissions trading program”). 
165 See Proposed National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; and in the 
Alternative, Proposed Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary 
Sources, 69 Fed. Reg. 4652, 4670-73 (January 30, 2004) (describing performance levels 
from technology testing and assessing technological capability for the industry based on 
those results); Supplemental Notice for the Proposed National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants, and, in the Alternative, Proposed Standards for the 
Performance of New and Existing Sources:  Electric Steam Generating Units, 69 Fed. 
Reg. 12398, 12402 (March 16, 2004) (concluding that current technologies are capable 
of achieving a 33 percent reduction in mercury emissions); Memorandum from EPA, 
Clean Air Markets Division to Docket, at 2, 8 (January 28, 2004) (estimating the cost of 
its identified technologies). 
166 See New Jersey, 517 F.3d 574 (holding that EPA had employed the wrong 
technology-based standard setting provision to write these standards).   
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and EPA have used technology-based limits even when no law forces 
them to do so.167  
 2.  Effects-Based Caps—BAT regulation may dominate trading 
programs, but not all trading programs depend upon BAT.  Research 
reveals examples of effects-based trading programs.   
 Many ecological trading programs outside the air pollution realm 
base their caps on the avoidance of undesirable effects.  For example, the 
federal government has adopted a trading approach under the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, which allows, under some circumstances, 
the destruction of wetlands if other wetlands are created or conserved.168  
The program caps the amount of total wetlands destroyed through a 
policy of “no net loss” of wetlands, an effects-based goal aimed at 
guarding against unacceptable ecological consequences.169   
 Similarly, many governments around the world use tradable 
fishing quotas to protect fisheries.170  The cap in these programs consists 
of an allowable catch limit, which fishery managers create to protect the 
fishery from collapse, i.e. to avoid a particular ecological effect.171  
These caps depend upon mathematical modeling of fishing’s ecological 
effects, rather than upon the evaluation of technology.172   
 Hence, governments sometimes, in spite of the difficulties of 
effects-based regulation, use trading programs to meet caps designed to 
avoid some unacceptable environmental outcomes.  This approach, while 
difficult to implement in many contexts, does away with the need to 
                                                
167 See, e.g., North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 916-92 (holding that EPA’s caps were illegal, 
because they focused on technological and equitable concerns rather than the degree of 
interstate pollution abatement needed to meet air quality standards). 
168 See Royal Gardner et al., Compensating for Wetland Losses under the Clean Water 
Act (Redux):  Evaluating the Federal Compensatory Mitigation Regulation, 38 
STETSON L. REV. 213, 215-217 (2009) (explaining that “in theory” a requirement to 
compensate for destroyed wetlands “ensures ‘no net loss’ of wetlands,” even though in 
practice it has “been problematic”).   
169 See Palmer Hough & Morgan Robertson, Mitigation under Section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act:  Where it Comes from What it Means, 17 WETLANDS ECOLOGY MGMT. 15, 
26-27 (2009) (discussing the adoption of the “no net loss” goal and its ties to trading, 
i.e. compensation for destroyed wetlands). 
170 See Alison Rieser, Prescriptions for the Commons: Environmental Scholarship and 
the Fishing Quota Debate, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 395 (1999). 
171 See National Fishery Management Program, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1802(34), 1851 (2007) 
(requiring that management plans prevent “overfishing” defined as creating a “rate of 
fish mortality” that “jeopardizes . . . maximum sustainable yield”); Maine v. Kreps, 563 
F.2d 1043, 1047 (1st Cir. 1977) (stating that the statute requires “scientific appraisal of 
the safe upper limit” of the catch that allows the stock to remain “inexhaustible and 
perpetually renewable”).  Cf. J.H. Miles & Co., Inc. v. Brown, 910 F. Supp. 1138, 
1154-55  (E.D. Va. 1995) (stating that efficiency can be taken into account, but is not 
the program’s  “primary objective”).  
172 See ORRIN H. PILKEY & LINDA PILKEY JARVIS, USELESS ARITHMETIC, 6-7, 10-21 
(2007) (discussing mathematical models’ use in establishing fishing quotas). 
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evaluate technologies and cost.  In other words, because this approach is 
really not a form of BAT regulation, it avoids BAT flaws.    
 3.  CBA and Cap Setting—While no statutes governing active 
environmental programs explicitly require CBA, the Office of 
Management of Budget (OMB), acting under executive orders, has often 
employed CBA to seek to influence or justify particular caps for trading 
programs.  Examples of caps where CBA played some role include the 
mercury rule and Clean Air Interstate Rule discussed above.173  In none 
of these cases, however, did either OMB or EPA engage in a serious 
effort to reach economically efficient pollution levels, as other statutory 
criteria governed the rulemaking.  
 4.  Caps on Greenhouse Gas Emissions—BAT has played a big 
role in the greenhouse gas emissions trading programs established to 
date.  But an effects-based approach has also emerged as potentially 
important.   
 BAT principles have strongly influenced cap setting for the EU 
ETS.  The EU Directive signals a technology-based approach by 
authorizing the consideration of benchmarks based on BAT, requiring 
information on the manner in which clean technology is taken into 
account, and demanding consistency with the potential, including 
“technological potential,” for reductions from covered activities.174    
 Faced with the apparent need to evaluate technologies in order to 
set caps, BAT defects played a large role in limiting the program’s 
success.  Generally speaking, the member states mandated no reductions 
in phase I, in part because of the informational demands of assessing 
technical potential for reductions to establish BAT-like benchmarks for 
improved performance.175  These difficulties also played a large role in 
phase II, which produced more progress, but not much more.176  Some 
member states evaluated specific technologies and set caps by 
determining the emissions level that could be achieved by application of 
available technologies (including fuel use changes) to the task of 
                                                
173 See RIA, supra note 122, at 20-162 (analyzing CBA’s role in these programs). 
174 See EU Directive, supra note 6, Annex III; EU ENERGY LAW:  EU ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW:  THE EU GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS TRADIING SCHEME 193 (Jas Delbeke et al. 
eds., 2006) (treating the term “benchmark” as a synonym for “performance standards”). 
175 See Rogge, Schleich, & Betz, supra note 94, at 24 (pointing out that benchmarks 
impose “stringent data requirements” on regulators and that insufficient data prevented 
benchmarking in establishing phase I caps); see also EU ALLOCATION, supra note 4, at 
352-52 (describing the difficulties encountered in trying to establish benchmarks based 
on BAT or average sectoral performance). 
176 See JON BIRGER SKJAERSETH & JORGEN WETTESTAD, EU EMISSIONS TRADING:  
INITIATION, DECISION-MAKING AND IMPLEMENTATION 62 (2008) (explaining that only 
four countries produced plans that satisfied the European Commission). 
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lowering estimated projected or historical emissions.177  Many states, 
however, employed benchmarks, requiring a whole group of pollution 
sources to meet the level many plants within an industry (but not all) had 
previously achieved.178  We have already seen that this benchmarking 
uses existing performance of some plants as a tool for evaluating 
technological capability for an entire industry and that benchmarking 
plays a large role in U.S. BAT provisions.  Member states’ national 
allocation plans generally contained fuel specific limits for new entrants, 
thereby duplicating a problem sometimes identified as a peculiar failing 
of BAT regulation rules favoring dirty existing fuels.179 Thus, a BAT 
approach, or a weaker variant of BAT, dominated EU cap setting.180  
This was true even though the EU guidance required member states to 
show that their caps were consistent with plans to meet their long-term 
quantitative reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol.181 
 While the EU plans to move toward an auction scheme in phase 
III of its program, beginning in 2013, its approach to improving free 
allocation in the years preceding full auctioning focuses on adopting the 
most stringent approaches associated with BAT.  Thus, it requires 
benchmarks based on the “the 10% of the most efficient installations in a 
sector or subsector.”182   This approach has much in common with the 
maximum achievable control technology program for hazardous air 
pollutants under the Clean Air Act, a BAT program, which requires 
facilities to at least match the level of emissions of the top 12% of 
facilities in a category of subcategory.183   
 Policy debate on future aggregate caps, both here and abroad, 
focuses on the idea of requiring something like an 80% reduction in 
developed country emissions by the year 2050, with an intermediate cap 
                                                
177 See NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLANS IN THE EU EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME:  
LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PHASE II 373 (Michael Grubb et al., eds., 2006) 
[hereinafter NAPS] (stating that Flanders and Wallonia used “BAT benchmarks”). 
178 See id. at 372-73 (discussing use of benchmarks based on average activity-weighted 
emissions for an industry group).  
179 See Rogge Schleich, & Betz, supra note 94, at 28-29 (characterizing this approach as 
favoring coal); Wolf Fichtner, The European Electricity Market, in INSTITUTIONAL 
EMISSIONS TRADING, supra note 9, at 121, 130 (pointing out that most countries use 
fuel specific benchmarks for new entrants, thereby reducing incentives to use cleaner 
fuels); Case T-374/04, Germany v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-4431, II-4457 (reporting 
an European Commission decision disapproving German ex-post adjustments of its 
NAP that favored new entrants); see also EU ALLOCATION, supra note 4, at 32 
(discussing “heavy political resistance” to “fuel-blind” allocation in the power sector). 
180 See generally EU ALLOCATION, supra note 4, at 32 (discussing industry demands 
that it receive the number of allowances adequate to meet “industry needs”). 
181 EU Directive, supra note 6, Annex III, item 3.   
182 See 2009 EU Amendments, supra note 21, art. 10a, § 2.   
183 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)(A). 
34 
August 26, 2009 Capping Carbon 
to assure timely progress toward that goal.184  For example, the 
Waxman-Markey bill that passed the House in 2009185 would generate 
up to a 33% reduction by 2020 and 81% by 2050 relative to a 2005 
baseline.186  The 80% cap comes from an attempt to evaluate how to 
meet the Framework Convention’s goal of avoiding dangerous climate 
disruption.187  Generally speaking, most scientific studies of this question 
suggest that the world must reduce its aggregate emissions by at least 
50% through 2050 to avoid an unacceptable temperature rise of more 
than two degrees centigrade.188  The Framework Convention requires 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” for greenhouse gas 
emission reductions, meaning that developed countries must do more 
than developing countries, which have limited capacity for emission 
reductions, less historic responsibility for climate disruption, and 
relatively low per capita emissions.189  Because of this principle and the 
political realities underlying it (that developing countries will not act 
unless developed countries lead), those analyzing the means of avoiding 
dangerous climate disruption envision uneven distribution of this 50% 
reduction across the globe, with the U.S. and other developed countries 
required to make a reduction of 80% more or less.190  Hence, the 80% 
                                                
184 See, e.g., 2009 EU Amendments, supra note 21, preamble  (4) (discussing the 
European Parliament’s position that industrialized countries should reduce their 
emissions by 60-80% below 1990 levels by the year 2050). 
185 See CRS, supra note 105, at 1 (noting that the House passed this bill on June 26, 
2009). 
186 John Larsen & Robert Heilmayr, Emission Reductions Under Cap-and-Trade 
Proposals in the 111th Congress 1 (2009), http://pdf.wri.org/usclimatetargets_2009-06-
25.pdf.  These estimates take into account provisions other than the caps for the general 
cap-and-trade program, as the bill creates additional emission reducing programs.  Id.   
187 See, e.g., AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16. 
188 Id. at 265 (discussing the scientific literature’s conclusion that temperature increases 
of 2°C and above trigger “potentially large-scale” adverse impacts, and giving 
examples); W.L. Hare, A Safe Landing for Climate, in STATE OF THE WORLD 2009:  
INTO A WARMING WORLD 13, 18-21, 26 (explaining that temperature rise of 2 degrees 
centigrade or more would likely prove dangerous and that total cuts of 40-60 percent of 
total greenhouse gas emissions below 1990 levels by 2050 might avoid this); Joanna I. 
House et al., What do Recent Advances in Quantifying Climate and Carbon Cycle 
Uncertainties Mean for Climate Policy, 3 ENV’T. RES. LETT. 1, 4 (2008) (claiming that 
when a 50% cut by 2050 is followed by an 80% cut by 2100 all models show warming 
of less than 2° C in 2100); MITIGATION, supra note 110, at 42 (concluding that 50% 
reductions from current levels could limit temperature increases to 2°-2.4°C).  Cf. H. 
Damon Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Stabilizing Climate Requires Near-Zero Emissions, 
35 L04705 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETT.  1, 1 (2008) (suggesting that we need to reduce 
emissions to zero to stabilize climate). 
189 See FCCC, supra note 83, art. 3(1); Driesen, supra note 81, at 11-15 (explaining 
why this principle embodies a requirement that developed countries lead by doing more 
than developing countries). 
190 See Peter G. Davies, Carbon Targets, Carbon Budgeting, and the Committee on 
Climate Change:  The 2008 UK Climate Change Act and the 2050 Vision, 1 ENVT’L 
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cap is effects-based, focused on the concept of an adequate contribution 
to a global effort to avoid some of climate disruption’s most serious 
predicted consequences.191   
 The existence of an informal consensus that something like a 
global 50% target (and by implication the developed country 80% target) 
approximates what is needed to avoid dangerous climate disruption 
suggests that it is possible to set an effects-based cap in this context.192 In 
the climate disruption context we know more about this dangerousness 
issue then we often do. Scientific consensus exists that climate disruption 
is likely to cause a number of very serious effects, and prominent peer 
reviewed scientific work concludes that stabilization of the climate 
requires large emission reductions.193  Moreover, while the decision 
about how safe is safe requires political judgment under conditions of 
uncertainty, scientific modeling’s predictions of what occurs when 
temperatures warm above 2°C powerfully support a social judgment that 
this level of temperature increase is dangerous.194   
 We can have more confidence in the conclusion that achieving 
less than a 50% global decrease is dangerous than a conclusion that 
                                                                                                                   
LIABILITY 3, 4 (2009) (showing that a UK scientific advisory committee recommended 
an increase in the 2050 target from 60 to 80% reductions for all gases because global 
emissions and ice melt increased more than scientists had predicted); Hare, supra note 
188, at 28 (offering an estimate of 80-95 percent reductions in developed country 
emissions by 2050 as an indication of what is needed to avoid exceeding two degrees of 
warming); AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16, at 306 (explaining 
that a “contraction and convergence” approach, in which global emissions contract 
while converging on common per capita emission rate among countries demands an 
80% reduction below 1990 levels by the year 2050 in order to limit atmospheric 
concentrations to 450 parts per million). 
191 See, e.g., Davies, supra note 190, at 4-5 (showing that the UK government endorses 
the 80% target pursuant to a policy of making a “reasonable contribution to a global 
objective of cutting [greenhouse gas emissions] by 50% or more below current levels”). 
192 See AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16, at 307 (finding that 
staying below 2°C likely requires 50-55% reductions for all greenhouse gas emissions),  
9-13 (summarizing scientific findings about impacts); EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, EU 
ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE, LEADING GLOBAL ACTION TO 2020 AND BEYOND 
5, 9 (2008) (connecting a commitment to 20-30% reductions by 2020 and up to 80% by 
2050 to the need to avoid a 2°C temperature rise). 
193 See AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16. 
194 See Hare, supra note 188, at 19 (pointing out that while it’s clear that warming 
greater than 2 degrees would be dangerous, there is no “magic number” that can make 
us completely safe); MITIGATION, supra note 110, at 32 (explaining that any judgment 
about what effects are dangerous “is necessarily . . . social and political”); AVOIDING 
DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16, at 98-99 (describing decreased 
agricultural yields, destruction of 97% of coral reefs, cyclones, sea level rise, ecosystem 
destruction, water related stress, extinction of species, drought, and other likely 
consequences at 2°C).  
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limiting temperature rise to 2°C creates safety.195  The consensus has its 
basis in model projections of routine warming, that leave out important, 
but non-quantifiable, feedback loops that have the potential to make 
climate disruption much worse than the models predict and some serious 
modeled effects occur with even less temperature rise.196  Still, the 
existence of any credible, or even semi-credible, partial scientific 
consensus on an effects-based cap is unusual and furnishes an 
opportunity for progress on climate disruption.  For it means that the 
ideal of having science heavily influence fine-grained environmental 
policy decisions, rarely an easy thing to accomplish, is theoretically 
possible to some degree in this context.197 
 
III.  TOWARD BETTER CAP SETTING 
 
 My descriptive claim appears to undermine the 
Ackerman/Stewart view of environmental law.  The message so far 
appears to be this:  Trading does not solve any of the key problems 
hindering effective cap setting, so while it proves useful in reducing 
costs, it does nothing to improve on traditional approaches in solving 
environmental problems.  
 Indeed, one of the few American legal scholars who have written 
about caps, Lesley McAllister, argues that caps set in conjunction with 
trading programs have been insufficiently stringent.198  This might 
                                                
195 John C. Dernbach, Achieving Early and Substantial Greenhouse Gas Reductions 
Under a Post-Kyoto Agreement, 20 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 573, 584-85 (2008) 
(characterizing the “quest for a safe level” of greenhouse gas emissions as “illusory,” 
but concluding that we need “substantial” short-term reductions to “reduce the risk of 
very bad outcomes”); AVOIDING DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 16, at 275 
(stating that stabilization at 550 parts per million (ppm) CO2 equivalent “is clearly not 
in line” with avoiding a 2°C temperature increase) (emphasis added). 
196 See MITIGATION, supra note 110, at 42 (concluding that the model predictions might 
understate temperature increases because of “climate feedbacks”); James Hansen, et al., 
Target CO2:  Where Should We Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 217 (2008) 
(suggesting a 350 ppm target).  Cf. House, supra note 188, at 3 (pointing out that some 
feedbacks are taken into account in climate models, but that prior model runs did not 
combine “high climate sensitivity with high climate-carbon cycle feedback”).   
197 See Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1613, 1614 (1995) (claiming that efforts to incorporate science into environmental 
regulation have failed).  I qualify my claim that science can guide aggregate cap setting 
for climate disruption for several reasons.  First, science cannot determine policy in 
theory, because society must make normative judgments about how to respond to 
science.  A decision to employ an effects-based approach, and more particularly, to try 
and avoid dangerous climate change while tolerating some ill effects, is an example of 
that sort of normative judgment.  Furthermore, the science is not so clear that it rules 
out some policy judgment in choosing an effects-based cap guided by an honest 
assessment of the science.    
198 See McAllister, supra note 11, at 102 (characterizing “several existing cap-and-trade 
programs” as insufficiently stringent). 
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suggest that trading simply undermines environmental protection and 
that my apparent message treats trading too kindly.   
 In fact, however, my view is quite different.  I do not deny 
Ackerman and Stewart’s claim that a cap-and-trade approach can aid 
environmental protection.  But for cap-and-trade to affirmatively 
advance environmental protection to a greater extent than available 
alternatives, its designers must build on both a sophisticated 
understanding of the role of costs in setting caps and Ackerman and 
Stewart’s suggestion that allowances should be auctioned, rather than 
given away for free.  Professor McAllister’s work does not claim that 
trading is always bad for the environment,199 for even if all previous caps 
have been deficient (and her claim is not quite that broad), it does not 
follow that all future ones must be.  Her work, however, does show that 
trading does not automatically create good environmental protection.  
My aim here is to consider how governments can avoid BAT defects 
through an appropriate cap-setting process, both generally and in the 
context of global climate disruption.   
 
A.  Aggregate Caps 
 Trading proponents frequently suggest that trading’s capacity to 
lower the cost of emission reductions increases the stringency of caps. 
Yet, well informed scholars generally agree that the caps undergirding 
the first phase of the European Union trading scheme and of the 
California Reclaim trading program were ridiculously weak.200  So, 
trading by itself does not guarantee a reasonably stringent approach.201    
 Trading could produce stricter caps than traditional regulation if 
regulators approach cap setting differently in the trading context than in 
the non-trading context.  A good theory of why trading might lead to 
superior caps must include some explanation of how regulators should 
establish caps in the trading context. 
 The view of trading as automatically improving environmental 
protection undermines regulation.  This view tends to focus regulators on 
                                                
199 See id. 
200 See id. at 114-15 (describing the EU ETS and RECLAIM as exemplars of 
overallocation); NAPS, supra note 177, at 361-394 (discussing the phase I plan); Justin 
Kirk, Note, Creating an Emissions Trading System for Greenhouse Gases: 
Recommendations to the California Air Resources Board, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 547, 558 
(2008) (noting that California’s RECLAIM program, a cap-and-trade program dealing 
with urban smog, “is generally viewed as a failure”).  Cf. Robert N. Stavins, Addressing 
Climate Change with a Comprehensive U.S. Cap-and-Trade System, 39 ENVTL. L. REP. 
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10752, 10753 (2009) (claiming that RECLAIM, “despite problems,” 
generated significant environmental benefits). 
201 See MARKET-BASED APPROACHES, supra note 26, at 59, 97 (claiming that Congress 
adopted the acid rain cap in spite of industry opposition and stating that a California 
program for trading VOCs was dropped because of lack of agreement about the cap). 
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the goal of setting up a market, instead of the goal of providing 
appropriate environmental protection.  From this perspective, setting an 
adequate cap may seem unimportant.  Regulators can get carried away 
with the excitement of creating a market and forget that caps largely 
determine the level of environmental protection achieved, not the 
trading.202    
 As should be apparent by now, administrative agencies can avoid 
BAT defects if they eschew consideration of cost, but not otherwise.  
This suggests that effects-based caps, such as the 80% targets for cap-
and-trade programs addressing greenhouse gas emissions, can allow 
governments to avoid BAT flaws, since these standards do not depend 
upon costs.  While an effects-based cure will, in many contexts prove 
worse than the disease, because of effect-based regulation’s defects, it 
offers a plausible way forward in addressing climate disruption. 
 Trading may contribute something to the case for abandoning 
BAT in favor of an effects-based approach.  Embrace of effects-based 
caps, even where sufficient scientific information exists to make one 
feasible, requires an adjustment in normative thinking.203  Such an 
approach will prove attractive in societies that view environmental 
protection as something more fundamental than just another good to be 
traded off against other goods, but not necessarily in societies that view 
environmental protection as a wholly economic problem solvable 
through careful cost calculation.  
 Trading, however, can increase opportunities for effects-based 
caps if trading helps regulators accept the idea that guesses about future 
costs do not furnish a reasonably reliable basis for regulation in the 
trading context.  Congress can adopt this idea by either setting stringent 
caps that treat cost estimates with a richly deserved grain of salt, or by 
requiring EPA to set caps without considering costs.  While this idea of 
deemphasizing cost estimates seems radical, there are sound reasons for 
deemphasizing the use of future cost estimates in designing caps for 
trading programs.204  First of all, governments have tended to seriously 
over-predict the regulation’s cost.205  All regulations create markets that 
                                                
202 See MITIGATION, supra note 110, at 19 (explaining that “the volume of allowed 
emissions determines” a tradable permit program’s “environmental effectiveness.”). 
203 Cf. INSTITUTIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING, supra note 9, at 32 (suggesting that 
movement toward a “new paradigm” based on emissions trading will require “a shift in 
the pattern of thoughts”). 
204 See Carlson, supra note 111, at 1320 (stating that attempts to estimate the costs of 
“future control programs” are likely to prove flawed, because of the difficulty of 
forecasting technological change). 
205 See Wendy Wagner, The CAIR RIA:  Advocacy Dressed up as Policy Analysis, in 
RIA, supra note 122, 56, 68 (explaining that President Bush’s EPA acknowledge that 
its past RIAs have overestimated costs by as much as 80 percent and all of its errors in 
the RIA tended toward overestimation); Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, 
Counting the Cost of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 
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tend to stimulate a search for low cost approaches, so it is not surprising 
that post-compliance studies show that pre-compliance estimates often 
prove too high.206  Trading facilitates a wider variety of low cost 
solutions than non-trading approaches, so the argument that pre-
compliance estimates will often prove too high appears even stronger in 
the trading context than outside of it.207  Also, the insight at the heart of 
the rationale for trading, that polluters have better marginal control cost 
information than regulators, suggests that government may have 
incomplete cost information when it tries to predict future costs.  Indeed, 
regulated parties have an incentive not to reveal their least costly control 
options to regulators in order to defeat stringent caps. Finally, even BAT 
regulations, often derided as discouraging innovation, encouraged many 
cost saving innovations not anticipated by regulators when sufficiently 
stringent.208  If trading proponents are correct that trading does a superior 
job at encouraging innovation, then this becomes an additional reason to 
consider cost prediction based on existing technologies especially 
unreliable in the trading context.209  Hence, there are sound reasons to 
                                                                                                                   
1997, 2042-44 (2002) (collecting studies); Carlson, supra note 111, at 1314 (explaining 
that both economists and environmentalists have alleged that EPA regularly 
overestimates compliance costs); Winston Harrington et al., On the Accuracy of 
Regulatory Cost Estimates, 19 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 297 (2000); Eban 
Goodstein & Hart Hodges, Polluted Data, 8 AM. PROSPECT 64 (1997); see also 
Florentin Krause et al., 21 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 90 (2003) (showing that most 
economic models have probably overpredicted costs by not including cost reducing 
policies that may well be adopted). 
206 See Carlson et al., supra note 111, at 1295 (showing that abatement costs for 
controlling acid rain declined after 1990 even for control under a performance 
standard); David M. Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation:  Beyond 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 24 ECOLOGY L. Q. 545, 601 (1995) (explaining that promulgation 
of a regulation creates an impetus to minimize costs among regulated firms, which 
tends to falsify even reasonable pre-promulgation estimates); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, 
REINVENTING RATIONALITY:  THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL 
BUREAUCRACY, 131 (1996) (finding a consistent pattern of overestimation of costs 
revealed in retrospective studies); Michael E. Porter & Claas Van der Linde, Toward a 
New Conception of the Environmental-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 
97 (Fall, 1995) (finding estimates of regulatory compliance costs systematically biased 
upwards). 
207 See EU ALLOCATION, supra note 4, at 363-64 (explaining that EU member states set 
their phase I caps too high based in part on the perception that no reasonably cheap 
abatement possibilities existed, but that the acid rain program shows that cap-and-trade 
can make “unexpected forms of abatement appear”); POLLUTION FOR SALE, supra note 
34, at 45 (claiming that trading “ignite[s]” a search for lower cost abatement 
techniques). 
208 See David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVTL. 
L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10094, 10103-04 (2003) (reviewing the empirical evidence). 
209 Id. at 10094 (pointing out that the “economic incentive” proponents “frequently state 
that emissions trading promotes technological innovation”); see Reyer Gerlagh, 
Measuring the Value of Induced Technological Change, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 5287 (2007) 
(showing that the cost savings from innovation induced by a climate policy can be 
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recognize, especially in the context of cap-and-trade, that future cost 
guesses provide an unreliable basis for regulation. 
 The strength of this argument for deemphasizing cost predictions 
increases with the aggregate cap’s scope.210  When a regulator tries to 
guess the costs of control at an individual facility or a single industry, it 
already faces a substantial potential for serious error.  But when a 
regulator sets a cap for most of the economy’s emissions, as Congress 
may do with respect to greenhouse gasses, the potential for error 
multiplies.211  For this exercise depends upon predictions of future costs 
for a variety of polluters, including some polluters that regulators study 
less frequently than the electric utility industry.212  And the broad trading 
market implies that unexpected cost saving innovation in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions almost anywhere in the economy can reduce 
the costs not just for the innovating firms, but also for many other firms, 
as innovations can reduce the costs of allowances traded in the market.       
   The strength of this argument against too much reliance on cost 
predictions also increases when regulators adopt long-term caps, like the 
2050 caps in many climate change bills.213  Bad as we are at predicting 
short-term compliance costs, we are even worse at predicting long-term 
costs.214  In the climate disruption context, for example, we have seen 
substantial cost decreases in renewable energy.215  Further decreases in 
                                                                                                                   
substantial); see, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 52, at 183; Daniel J. Dudek & 
John Palmisano, Emissions Trading:  Why is This Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. 
J. ENVTL. L. 217, 234-35 (1988).  I have been recognized as a skeptic of the view that a 
cap with trading provides better incentives for valuable innovation than an identical cap 
without trading.  See Avi-Yonah & Uhlmann, supra note 21, at 27 n. 105 (discussing 
and agreeing with my skepticism about trading’s superiority as a stimulator of 
innovation); see also David M. Driesen, Design, Trading, and Innovation, in MOVING 
TO MARKETS, supra note 111, 436, 442 (showing division on this question among 
economists).   
210 See Stephan Alberth & Chris Hope, Climate Modeling with Endogenous Technical 
Change: Stochastic Learning and Optimal Greenhouse Gas Abatement in the 
PAGE2002 Model, 335 ENERGY POL’Y 1795 (2007) (explaining that with widespread 
abatement, uncertainty of cost estimation increases because of our lack of knowledge of 
the “learning investments” that reduce abatement costs over time).   
211 See, e.g. MITIGATION, supra note 112, at 11 (reporting that economic studies of 
mitigation estimate the cost at between a 3% decrease and a small increase in global 
GDP).   
212 See id. at 43-76 (summarizing basic information about significant sectors generating 
greenhouse gas emissions) 
213 See id. at 150-152 (explaining why technological change over long periods creates 
enormous uncertainty in cost estimation). 
214 See Keohane, supra note 1, at 47 (pointing out that the long-term costs of abatement 
will not be known in advance); MITIGATION, supra note 112, at 18 (reporting estimates 
of mitigation costs in 2050 as varying between a 1% and a 5.5% decrease in GDP, a 
range even wider than that shown in estimates of mitigation costs in 2030).  
215 See J. Greenblatt et al., Baseload Wind Energy:  Modeling Competition Between Gas 
Turbines and Compressed Energy Air Energy Storage for Supplemental Generation, 35 
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these costs could drastically reduce the anticipated cost of addressing 
climate disruption.216  Also, the likelihood of an oil supply shortage 
raising the costs of not addressing climate disruption (which would lower 
the incremental cost of addressing it) increases over long time scales.217  
I do not mean to rule out the possibility of unexpected cost increases.  
But the idea that cost predictions form a reliable basis for regulation 
appears especially fanciful on long time scales. 
 In short, an understanding of the economic dynamics of 
regulation can make trading a tool for setting more stringent caps than 
might be possible without it.  A strong normative case for effects-based 
regulation can perform this function as well. But the mere adoption of 
trading without such changes in thinking does not produce an escape 
from BAT-like restraints on caps. 
 In principle, trading can also facilitate more stringent cap setting 
if regulators take guesses about the cost savings from trading into 
account in setting caps.  Economists modeling the costs of trading 
programs typically engage in a BAT-like evaluation.  They estimate the 
control costs from technologies available to the industry. 218 They then 
project the cost savings available from trading through efficient 
rearrangement of these technologies, which trading should facilitate.219  
Thus, BAT flaws can infect this approach, as it depends on evaluation of 
technological options.   
                                                                                                                   
ENERGY POL’Y 1474, 1474 (2007) (stating that the capital costs of installed wind energy 
dropped twofold between 1992 and 2001); Commission of the European Communities, 
The Share of Renewable Energy in the EU:  Evaluation of the Effect of Legislative 
Instruments and Other Community Policies on the Development of the Contribution of 
Renewable Energy Resources in the EU and Proposals for Concrete Actions, 2004 
(SEC) 547, 19; (finding a 50% drop in wind costs over the previous 15 years); L. 
Barreto & S. Kypreos, Emissions Trading and Technology Deployment in an Energy-
Systems ‘Bottom-up’ Model with Technology Learning, 158 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL RES. 
243, 246-48 (2004) (estimating an 80% progress ratio for solar photovoltaics, 
representing the rate of cost decline per doubling of production).   
216 See, e.g., Terry Barker et al., Achieving the G8 50% Target: Modeling Induced and 
Accelerated Technological Change Using the Macro-Econometric Model E3mg, 8 
CLIMATE POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) S30 (2008); Claudia Kemfert & Truong Truong, 
Impact Assessment of Emissions Stabilization Scenarios with and without Induced 
Technological Change, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 5337 (2007) (showing that increased research 
and development tends to increase energy efficiency, thereby achieving climate targets 
more cheaply through enhanced efficiency rather than production declines). 
217 See generally MITIGATION, supra note 112, at 260 (noting that increases in oil prices 
might reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but might produce more use of coal).   
218 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 111, 1299 (describing evaluation of the costs of 
scrubbing and fuel switching as the first step in constructing marginal abatement cost 
curves for control of sulfur dioxide). 
219 See, e.g., id. (describing the second step of estimating trading’s cost as figuring out 
the least cost means of using these technologies to meet the cap).   
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 Indeed, while considering trading’s cost savings can help justify 
more stringent caps, it can also create additional contentious issues, and, 
if employed in an administrative cap-setting process, litigable issues.  
Economists’ predictions about future prices in markets generally or in 
trading markets in particular have generally not proven accurate.220 Any 
such prediction requires a regulator to endorse a set of debatable 
assumptions in an economic model.221 Implementation of the 
economists’ implicit suggestion that regulators should base their 
regulations on estimate the cost of a trading program’s cost, leaves the 
regulator subject to all of the traditional strife and litigation risks 
associated with analyzing technologies’ costs plus whatever disputes 
arise about the incomplete information about the projected cost savings 
from the trading.  Thus, the suggestion that trading should facilitate 
stricter cap setting, while analytically plausible, increases the complexity 
of the exercise for regulators.   
 Institutional factors, however, play a very important role in 
aggregate cap setting. Ackerman and Stewart’s seminal work on 
emissions trading specifically advocates having the legislature, rather 
than an administrative agency, set the cap in order to democratize goal 
setting.  The possibility that Congress may set a cap itself rather than 
delegate cap setting to EPA does not justify choosing trading over 
traditional regulation, but it does offer concrete advice on how to create 
caps.  It does not justify a choice of trading, because the legislature can 
set caps for a trading program or a non-trading program.222  Indeed, 
Congress has written emission limits for specific industries into 
legislation in several cases.223 Yet, legislative cap setting can avoid some 
BAT-like problems.  In particular, Ackerman and Stewart place some 
emphasis on litigation and attendant delay as a particularly significant 
BAT flaw.  The litigation they refer to occurs when an administrative 
agency must follow a statutory command to establish a cap based on a 
                                                
220 See Keohane, supra note 163, at 39-40 (faulting EPA for assuming a perfectly 
functioning emissions trading market in modeling the costs of a proposed trading 
program, but acknowledging that predicting the actual performance of such markets lies 
“at the frontier of economic research”); Carlson et al., supra note 111, at 1315 (finding 
that EPA overestimated the cost of sulfur dioxide control because it anticipated too 
much reliance on scrubbers, rather than fuel switching, and failed to foresee a 50% 
decline in scrubbing’s cost). 
221 See MITIGATION,  supra note 112, at 79 (finding cost estimates “heavily dependent 
on approaches and assumptions”); POLLUTION FOR SALE, supra note 34, at  36 (noting 
that early studies of the acid rain’s cost savings potential produced widely disparate 
estimates partly because they varied in how many trades they anticipated). 
222 See Driesen, supra note 2, at 306 (noting that the claim that technology-based 
standards implicate the complexity, delays, and litigation associated with administrative 
proceedings does not apply to legislatively set limits). 
223 See David M. Driesen, Five Lessons from Clean Air Act Implementation, 14 PACE 
ENVTL. L. REV. 51, 52-54 (1997). 
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technological assessment.  Since the agency must both conform its 
conduct to a statute and have a reasonable basis for its conclusions about 
technologies’ cost and efficacy, even in the face of substantial 
uncertainties, this sort of determination creates litigable issues.224   
 A legislative body faces no such constraints.  While determining 
technological feasibility in order to set a cap is no easier for a legislature 
than an administrative body, it would be a complete waste of money to 
challenge a legislative decision about a cap as unreasonable in a lawsuit, 
because of the deference courts pay to legislative decisions under the 
Constitution.225  Accordingly, while industry litigates just about every 
agency BAT decision, I am not aware of a single industry challenge to 
the reasonableness of a legislatively imposed emission limit.    It follows 
then, that legislative cap setting offers powerful advantages over 
administrative cap setting.  The acid rain program’s success may owe a 
lot to the Congressional decision to set caps itself, rather than to delegate 
the entire task to EPA. 
 Unfortunately, legislative cap setting can exacerbate another 
problem associated with BAT, the difficulty of updating caps.  Political 
deadlock has regularly produced long delays in revising outdated 
environmental statutes and can stall environmental improvement.  
Trading may make that problem even more difficult, because it creates 
expectations that government will not disturb the market it creates by 
revising caps.226  One can imagine reforms that might address this 
problem.  For example, Congress could enact a mathematical formula 
adjusting caps automatically to match substantial deviations in climate 
change metrics, such as temperature, atmospheric greenhouse gas 
concentrations, or sea level rise, from the expectations prevailing when 
the legislature established the initial caps.227  But absent some sort of 
automatic ratchet in a cap, revision will pose political difficulties.   
 The foregoing analysis suggests several ways of escaping some 
BAT defects.  Regulators committed to effects-based standard setting 
can avoid the complexities of BAT analysis by not considering cost, if 
                                                
224 See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 36, at 13 n. 73 (collecting cases). 
225 Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (stressing the deference due 
legislative decisions); see Turner v. Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (stating 
that economic legislation is presumed to be constitutional); United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (stating that regulatory statutes will be upheld 
unless they lack a rational basis). 
226 Cf. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Waxman-Markey), H.R. 
2454, 111th Cong. 1st Sess. §§ 705-07 (requiring reports on climate change science and 
the use of “existing statutory authority” to address shortfalls in obtaining environmental 
goals).     
227 I thank Douglas Kysar for suggesting varying the cap with damage estimates, which 
led to this idea.  Cf. id. §§ 705(c)(6)(A-B),(e),(f), 706(d)(3)(B), 707(a) (requiring 
agency action if temperature or greenhouse gas concentrations are expected to rise 
above 2° C or 450 ppmCO2e).   
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statutes authorize this.228  Also, to the extent Congress itself sets caps, it 
can avoid many (but not all) of the relevant BAT defects, because of the 
difficulty of a constitutional challenge to legislatively imposed caps.  
And Congress can incorporate automatic ratchets into caps to avoid the 
BAT-like difficulties in revision of limits.     
 The suggestion that Congress set the caps raises an important 
institutional issue. How much cap setting can a legislature find time for?  
For trading does not magically do away with the need for delegation of 
some decisions to administrative agencies.  Indeed, administrative 
agencies have created most trading programs initiated to date in the 
United States.   
 The evidence in the climate change bills pending in Congress 
suggests that Congress may find time to set an aggregate cap, but is 
unlikely to be able to set individual caps on all of the important sources 
covered under the trading program, for none of the pending bills contain 
individual caps.229  The Waxman-Markey bill includes both an annual 
aggregate cap (which declines after a few years of increases) and 
detailed decisions allocating percentages of that cap to various sectors.230  
But this bill requires agency translation of these sectoral allocations into 
caps for individual entities in subsequent rulemakings.231  This is hardly 
surprising.  Congress has never established individual caps for an 
economy-wide environmental program.  Congress, as we have seen, 
managed to set individual limits for electric utilities in the acid rain 
program, a relatively small and very well understood set of facilities in a 
single industry.  But it has always delegated task of realizing reductions 
in pollution to achieve broad environmental goals demanding changes in 
several industries at once to EPA and/or to the states.232  The 
unlikelihood of Congressional individual cap setting in the climate 
disruption context raises the issue considered next:  How should 
Congress address the problem of translating aggregate caps it might set 
through legislative agreement into individual caps necessary for a 
successful trading program?   
                                                
228 An administrative agency, however, may find setting caps through an effects-based 
approach or a cost-benefit approach even more problematic.   
229 Cf. S. 1766, 110th Cong., § 501 (2007) (authorizing the President to require 60% 
reductions by 2050 if our largest trading partners take comparable actions). 
230 See H.R. 2454, §§ 721(e)(1), 782.  For analysis of the sectoral distribution, see JOHN 
LARSEN & ROBERT HEILMAYR, WRI BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF ALLOWANCE 
DISTRIBUTION UNDER H.R. 2454, THE AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND SECURITY ACT 
(WAXMAN-MARKEY) (2009), 
http://pdf.wri.org/usclimatetargets_allowance_distribution_2009-06-25.pdf; ROBERT 
STAVINS, THE WONDERFUL POLITICS OF CAP-AND-TRADE:  A CLOSER LOOK AT 
WAXMAN-MARKEY (2009), http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/analysis/stavins/?p=108 
231 See H.R. 2454, §§ 783(b)-(g); 784(b); 785(b); 787(e); 788(b),(c). 
232 See DRIESEN & ADLER, supra note 107, at 501 (comparing state and federal roles 
under the Clean Air and Water Acts). 
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B.  Individual Caps 
 The previous analysis shows that Congress has two options for 
translating its aggregate caps into individual caps when it cannot 
accomplish this through specific legislation.  It may employ a market-
based individual cap setting, in which it directs an administrative agency 
to auction off the appropriate number of allowances to the highest 
bidder.   Or, it may employ government individual cap setting in which 
the legislature either establishes individual caps itself or directs an 
administrative agency to do so.  This part urges use of the market-based 
approach when the legislature cannot establish the caps itself, for this 
approach best avoids the BAT-like problems that Ackerman and Stewart 
cite as a justification for trading.  But it also considers how Congress 
might design administrative processes better if it does not fully adopt 
auctioning and must delegate individual cap setting to an administrative 
agency.    
 1.  Market-Based Cap Setting—A market-based individual cap- 
setting approach avoids BAT defects.  Under this approach, regulators 
auction off allowances to the highest bidder.   In formulating a bid, 
polluters will likely evaluate their own marginal control costs.  A rational 
polluter will not want to purchase allowances costing more than the 
marginal control costs at her facility.  This implies that polluters facing 
higher marginal control costs will pay more money for auctioned 
allowances than polluters enjoying relatively low marginal costs.  Hence, 
a market-based allocation accomplishes cost effective cap setting, since 
those facing higher marginal control costs will purchase more 
allowances than those with low marginal control costs.  And it does so 
by relieving regulators of responsibility for evaluating cost and 
technology, and placing the responsibility for that on owners of polluting 
facilities.233   
 Having the market rather than the regulator set the individual 
caps avoids all of the delays and other BAT-like problems associated 
with cost sensitive administrative cap setting.234  It frees the regulator 
from having to gather marginal control cost information from numerous 
and sometimes uncooperative firms in order to fine-tune individual 
caps.235  It avoids the problem of incentivizing firms to exaggerate their 
                                                
233 Cf. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 17, at 1343 (claiming that trading transfers the 
job of technological and economic assessment from “bureaucrats” to “business 
managers and engineers”). 
234 Cf. Rogge, Schleiche, & Betz, supra note 94, at 25 (“Auctioning off allowances 
could avoid most, if not all, problems which result in inefficient and complex rules”). 
235 Cf. National Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 433 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing 
industry’s failure to respond to a data request and speculating that it may have withheld 
data unfavorable to its position). 
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costs in order to avoid stringent individual caps.   Market-based cap 
setting also eliminates litigation over administrative decisions about 
individual caps.   
 The revenue realized through auctions can help overcome the 
political inertia that makes caps in a trading program difficult to revise 
absent adoption of an automatic ratchet.  Under RGGI, the states 
spending auction revenue have devoted the overwhelming majority of 
these resources to funding energy efficiency measures.236  The RGGI 
trading program may well raise the cost per kilowatt hour of electricity, 
since the program caps the emissions of electric utilities in the region.237  
By financing energy efficiency measures in businesses and households, 
however, the states can reduce the number of kilowatt hours that people 
must purchase to meet their needs.238  This can make it possible to 
increase the expense of generating electricity while actually reducing the 
overall costs to energy users, since users face the costs generated by 
multiplying their cost per kilowatt hour times the number of kilowatt 
hours used to power their households and businesses.239  Energy 
efficiency funding not only generates immediate environmental benefits 
from avoided greenhouse gas emissions, it also reduces burdens that 
might otherwise pose an obstacle to further tightening caps in the future.  
Thus, auctions allow trading to offer an easier path to revision of limits 
than BAT offers. Environmental scholarship on trading has hitherto 
largely neglected the idea that auctions may often prove essential to 
sufficient environmental progress because of its potential to overcome 
the inertia that has plagued complicated regulatory systems.240
                                                
236 See Cowart, supra note 100, at 218 (concluding that RGGI states will devote as 
much as 80% of auction revenue to energy efficiency). 
237 See RGGI, RGGI FACT SHEET at 2 (updated 2009), 
http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_Executive%20Summary_4.22.09.pdf (projecting that 
RGGI will modestly increase electricity rates). 
238 See Cowart, supra note 100, at 216-17 n.51 (predicting reduced consumption 
and lower power bills for consumers who employ efficiency measures). 
239 See WILLIAM R. PRINDLE ET AL., ENERGY EFFICIENCY'S ROLE IN A CARBON CAP-
AND-TRADE SYSTEM: MODELING RESULTS FROM THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS 
INITIATIVE 17 (2006), http://aceee.org/pubs/e064.pdf (stating energy efficiency can 
lower consumer electricity bills). 
240 This neglect may stem from a broad reading of Ackerman and Stewart.  They write, 
“[M]arketability would immediately eliminate most of the information-processing tasks 
that are presently overwhelming the federal and state bureaucracies.” Ackerman & 
Stewart, supra note 17, at 1342. This statement seems to suggest, incorrectly, that 
trading by itself, even trading based on administrative cap setting, necessarily allows 
administrators to avoid consideration of cost and technology in cap setting.  See id. at 
1341-42 (stating that a “system of tradable rights . . . will . . .reduce the incentives for 
litigation”).  But in the same article, Ackerman and Stewart write that “the auction 
system would . . . reduce the opportunity and incentive of polluters to use the legal 
system for delay and construction by finessing the complex BAT issues.” See id. at 
1345 (emphasis added). This latter statement is more accurate, as it is possible to avoid 
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 Managers of polluting firms, however, tend to resist auctions, as 
they would rather not pay for residual emissions after the cap is met and 
would like to retain possible windfall profits from allowance 
giveaways.241  Some grounds exist, however, for them to rethink their 
position.  The uncertainties and delays from BAT regulation have been a 
source of considerable expense and irritation for regulated polluters. The 
combination of industry and environmentalist litigation and lobbying 
creates substantial delays and uncertainties, which make rational 
planning difficult for businesses.  A market-based individual cap-setting 
system, i.e. an auction, can avoid substantially all of these delays and 
uncertainties.242   
 Businesses confronting an administrative cap-setting system may 
find themselves investing significant resources in lobbying and litigating 
to try and adjust their individual caps to their liking.  They face a 
prisoner’s dilemma, in that any individual firm that refrains from 
lobbying may find that their competitors wrest allowances from them 
through their lobbying, thereby obtaining a competitiveness advantage. 
But this lobbying will produce winners and losers, not just winners.  If 
the aggregate cap is firm, then EPA can only accommodate some firms 
and must tighten up on the remainder to make up for it.243 Because 
business will end up wasting a lot of money and effort creating 
uncertainties for themselves in a government cap-setting system, even 
though some will gain cost savings and others will suffer from cost 
increases, firms would be wise to support auctioning.244 
 Whether or not auctioning advances the regulated firms’ 
interests, market-based cap setting better serves societal needs than 
administrative cap setting.  While the literature recognizes many of 
auctioning’s advantages,245 it has paid scant attention to auctioning’s 
                                                                                                                   
BAT issues through effects-based aggregate legislative cap setting coupled with 
market-based individual cap setting. 
241 See INSTITUTIONAL TRADING, supra note 9, at 27 (attributing the EU decision not to 
auction allowances to “industrial rent-seeking”); Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. 
Revesz, & Robert N. Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental 
Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (1998) (explaining that polluters prefer free 
allocation, because it relieves them of the obligation to pay for residual emissions once 
the cap is met). 
242 Cf. Nordhaus, supra note 134, at 37-39 (discussing allowance prices’ volatility); 
Keohane, supra note 1, at 44 (finding volatility fears “overstated”). 
243 See Keohane, supra note 1, at 46 (describing allowance allocation as a “zero-sum 
game”). 
244 Cf. EU ALLOCATION, supra note, 4, at 127 (pointing out that major Danish power 
producers supported 100% auctioning, as long as it applied across the EU); IV EU 
ENERGY LAW:  EU ENVIRONMENTAL LAW:  THE EU GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
TRADIING SCHEME 191 (Jas Delbeke et al. eds., 2006) (reporting that some firms in 
Europe began to support auctioning because of the potential for competitive advantage). 
245 See Noriko Fujiwara & Christian Egenhofer, What Lessons Can be Learned from the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme, CEPS POLICY BRIEF No. 153, 1 (February 2008), 
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potential to circumvent BAT defects that otherwise often can delay or 
even stymie effective cap setting.  Recognizing these powerful 
institutional advantages should justify a move from slow incomplete 
auctioning to rapid emulation of RGGI’s reform, introduction of 
widespread early auctioning.  Delays at the outset of a program have 
great potential to hinder the whole program going forward, by 
introducing uncertainty into the system that weakens economic 
incentives for the needed long-term investments.   
 Auctioning can also “help ensure that new entrants face the same 
emission reduction costs as existing firms.”246  Government allocation of 
allowances, by contrast, can easily duplicate the problem of disfavoring 
new and potentially cleaner production that Ackerman and Stewart 
associate with BAT.247  If government, for example, allocates all of the 
allowances to existing sources, then new firms with carbon emissions 
can only enter the market if they purchase allowances from existing 
firms, who may be reluctant to sell at reasonable prices.  And the 
influence of incumbents on legislative and administrative processes 
makes this sort of favoritism a significant concern.   Congress should 
require 100% auctioning at the outset, rather than employ inevitably 
uncertain and slow administrative cap setting to initiate the program.    
 2.  Administrative Cap Setting—Nearly all of the climate change 
bills contain some administrative mechanism for setting individual 
caps.248  While recognition of the tendency of cap setting for trading to 
mimic BAT supports auctioning, this insight can also inform 
administrative individual cap setting if it persists because of political 
support for it from industry.  A desire to avoid the delays and 
complexities associated with BAT should lead analysts to evaluate 
climate change bills and recommend reforms based on the goal of 
minimizing both.  
                                                                                                                   
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1334060 (explaining that power generators booked “handsome 
windfall profits” under ETS grandfathering); Cowart, supra note 100, at 215 (reporting 
an estimate of $1 billion dollars in annual windfall profits as likely in the RGGI 
program under grandfathering); Keohane, supra note 1, at 44 (pointing out that revenue 
from an allowance auction could reach hundreds of billions of dollars a year, about 10 
percent of current tax receipts); Rogge, Schleich, & Betz, supra note 94, at 21 (pointing 
out that auction revenue could pay for tax reductions that might increase employment). 
246 GAO, supra note 103, at 8. 
247 BAT by itself does not necessarily disfavor new sources, but the decision in the 
legislation creating BAT approaches to apply stricter standards to new sources than to 
existing sources can create this problem.   Cf. DRIESEN, supra note 27, at 187-192 
(suggesting economic dynamic analysis as a new method for evaluating the impacts of 
new source review on modernization and arguing that the gutting of statutory 
provisions requiring new source controls for modified sources is important).  
248 See, e.g., S. 3036, 110th Cong. 2d Sess. (2008) (styled a bill “to direct the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to establish a program to reduce 
greenhouse gases . . .”); infra note 231. 
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An administrative approach to individual cap setting may prove 
prone to BAT-like problems, even when it allocates allowances under an 
aggregate cap previously set by a legislature.  Regulated parties would 
have an incentive to lobby EPA vigorously to realize their interest in lax 
individual caps, since more allowances translate into more allowable 
emissions and less need for potentially costly changes.249   
 Firms will argue for lax individual caps on the basis of the high 
costs they might face in complying with a strict one.  If the legislation 
authorizing EPA to set individual caps authorizes consideration of costs 
or technology, EPA’s duty to respond to significant comments will 
require it to address those arguments reasonably.  In order to respond 
reasonably, EPA may have to assess the costs of technologies available 
to achieve the individual caps in order to evaluate numerous claims 
about compliance costs.  Once EPA sets individual caps, firms can 
presumably litigate the question of whether EPA acted reasonably in 
setting them.  Thus, any legislation authorizing EPA to consider costs in 
setting individual caps and authorizing judicial review of its decisions 
invites a process that infects trading with BAT defects. 
 Unfortunately, some provisions in pending climate change bills 
may open the door to this sort of BAT-like problem in the rulemaking 
proceedings establishing individual caps. For example, the Waxman-
Markey bill requires EPA to “consider the relative complexity of refinery 
processes and appropriate mechanisms to take energy efficiency and 
greenhouse gas reductions into account” in establishing a formula for 
allocating allowances to individual petroleum refineries.250  This 
language seems to invite arguments about the relative technological 
potential for greenhouse gas reductions at different types of refineries.251 
 Fortunately, several bill provisions reflect some recognition of 
BAT’s dangers by establishing formulas for administrative allowance 
allocation.252  These formulas, however, may also engender litigation and 
                                                
249 See POLLUTION FOR SALE, supra note 34, at 3 (pointing out that the “initial 
distribution of permits” has “significant economic consequences” for regulated 
polluters). 
250 American Clean Energy and Security Act (Waxman-Markey), H.R. 2454, 111th 
Cong. 1st Sess. § 787(e) (2009). 
251 The requirement to account for refinery processes’ “relative complexity” seems 
aimed at the idea that facilities whose configurations limit opportunities to make 
emission reductions should get more allowances than those with more opportunities.  
See id. If so, the agency would have to evaluate these complexities, not in the abstract, 
but as they impact various conceivable technological changes.  While the requirement 
to “take. . . greenhouse gas reductions” into account probably suggests not penalizing 
and perhaps benefitting refinery owners that provide early reductions, it can also be 
read to authorize or require assessment of future technological possibilities for emission 
reductions.  See id.   
252 See, e.g., id., §§ 782, 783(b)-(d), 784(b), 785(c); S. 3091, §§ 3401; 3402; 3501-3502; 
3902(b)(2); 3904(c).  
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delay, as some of them prove quite complicated and data-intensive.  For 
example, the Waxman-Markey bill establishes a formula for establishing 
large electric utilities’ individual caps that requires that 50% of the 
allowances correspond to their carbon dioxide emissions and 50% 
correspond to their electricity deliveries.253  For existing utility units, the 
bill allows the utility to select any 3 year period between 1999 and 2008 
as a baseline for purposes of calculating the emissions and delivery 
numbers.254  This baseline flexibility increases EPA’s burden, leading to 
a requirement that it determine the amount of emissions and production 
associated with each utility in each year from 1999 through 2008.255    
The EU experience teaches that the availability of economy-wide fuel 
use data, which forms the basis for the aggregate cap, does not imply the 
existence of adequate facility-specific data.256  The bill recognizes this 
and uses a device familiar to all careful students of command and control 
regulation, authorization to use the “best available data,” in this case 
when utility-specific fuel use data is missing or incomplete.257  But this 
provision provides a nice opportunity for utilities seeking “hard look” 
judicial review of individual caps by demanding that the emission 
estimates be “as precise as practicable.”258   This locution invites 
litigation of the question of whether EPA in extrapolating from 
incomplete data was “as precise as practicable” or “arbitrary and 
capricious.”  While simpler formulas (which appear in some Waxman-
Markey provisions) and eschewing any demand for precision can help; 
even simple formulas can give rise to delay and litigation in the 
contentious environmental law arena.259   
 These bills generally authorize some exceptions to the 
requirement of maintaining the aggregate cap.260  For example, 
                                                
253 Id. § 783(a)(2),(b). Cf. id. § 783(e) (small utilities’ allowances based on emissions 
alone).   
254 Id. § 783(b)(2)(B),(3)(A)   
255 Id. § 783(b)(2)(C). 
256 See EU ALLOCATION, supra note 4, at 339-40 (explaining that in spite of “reasonably 
good inventories of CO2 emissions data” derived from aggregate energy use, the lack of 
specific installation specific data “was perhaps the biggest problem” that confronted 
member states in allocating allowances).  
257 H.R. 2454, § 783(b)(2)(C)(iii)(II). 
258 Id. § 783(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
259 See, e.g., id. § 783(c) (basing formula on emissions only), (d)(1), (f)(2) (employing a 
legislatively-determined 3-year baseline period); GAO, supra note 103, at 15 
(suggesting that even the definition of output in a formula can be “subject to numerous 
interpretations”); see generally Daniel Farber A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously:  
Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 297, 297 (1999) (explaining that the gap between the law and its implementation 
“is sometimes a chasm” in the environmental law arena).  
260 See, e.g., H.R. 2454 § 721(e)(2) (authorizing adjustment of caps if various 
assumptions about emission baselines prove erroneous); S. 3036, § 2604 (authorizing 
adjustment of caps based on cost considerations). 
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Waxman-Markey authorizes a one-time adjustment of the cap if certain 
assumptions about the baseline emissions employed in creating them 
prove erroneous.261  When such exceptions exist, an administrative body 
may well weaken the aggregate cap to accommodate various industry 
concerns about individual caps.  Congress can provide the regulatory 
certainty needed to encourage long-term planning to reduce emissions by 
not providing such exceptions, since Congress can always revisit the 
legislation if carbon caps create truly unacceptable economic havoc.   
 If Congress wishes to avoid replicating the difficulties that 
Ackerman and Stewart claim limited the BAT programs’ efficacy, it 
could limit the tendency of industry to use litigation to obstruct 
individual cap setting by prohibiting judicial review, except under very 
narrow circumstances.  Congress has prohibited judicial review of other 
kinds of subsidiary rulemaking.  For example, in the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments, Congress required EPA, as a prelude to establishing 
standards for hazardous air pollutants, to set up a schedule for regulating 
the industries emitting listed pollutants.262  Congress had already made 
the most important decisions, having chosen the pollutants EPA must 
regulate and the normative criterion to guide EPA in capping 
emissions.263  While the precise outcome of the scheduling decision has 
much less public policy importance than these crucial decisions, every 
industry could save money by trying to get its emissions regulated late in 
the schedule, so considerable potential existed for industry to delay this 
essential scheduling step through litigation.264  Congress, therefore, 
prohibited judicial review of the scheduling decision.265   
 A similar rationale would justify prohibiting judicial review of 
the individual cap-setting decisions under an aggregate cap.  Congress 
will likely make the most important decisions, the decisions about the 
aggregate amount of reductions and their allocation to individual sectors, 
in the legislation itself.  The allocation of these sectoral allowances to 
create individual caps, while of interest to regulated firms, matters 
relatively little to the society as a whole.  In that context, it might make 
sense to generally prohibit litigation about the allocation.  But Congress 
should allow challenges to the allocation on the grounds that it does not 
conform to the aggregate cap.  Otherwise, the allocation might 
circumvent, rather than implement the cap. 
                                                
261See H.R. 2454  § 721(e)(2). 
262 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c). 
263 See id. § 7412(d)-(f) 
264 See Driesen, supra note 131, at 10006 (mentioning that Congress realized that 
exercises in rank-ordering priorities could trigger litigation before any cleanup could 
occur). 
265 See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(3).  Congress made a similar decision to exempt scheduling 
of rulemaking from judicial review under the Resources Conservation and Recovery 
Act.   See Driesen, supra note 131, at 10006. 
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 I do not contend that my analysis here of a moving target, climate 
legislation pending in Congress, exhaustively considers all of the 
possible avenues for avoiding administrative and judicial mischief as 
pollution sources seek to reduce their constraints as allowances are 
allocated.  But recognition of the potential for BAT-like delay in 
emissions trading program should lead to careful analysis of climate 
change bills to spot issues producing potential for litigable strife, and an 
effort to minimize this potential.  Of course, the best method for 
achieving this, by far, is to just auction off all of the allowances. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Trading owes some of its allure to its apparent ability to 
automatically accomplish tasks that have proven quite difficult for 
regulatory systems.  Ironically, if we believe that trading automatically 
generates reductions, it will not.  We can only give trading programs a 
good chance of success if we make wise choices about how to do set 
caps. Trading does not allow us to escape difficult normative choices; 
general lessons about the normative value and practical difficulties of 
various cap-setting approaches apply to cap setting in the trading 
context. 
 The analysis above shows that trading has often been a form of 
BAT, not an alternative to it.266  While regulators cannot avoid 
technological evaluation if they wish to take costs into account in setting 
caps, an effects-based approach can avoid BAT defects.  Furthermore, 
Congressional cap setting, as opposed to administrative cap setting, can 
circumvent many of the difficulties that led to criticism of BAT, but can 
make revision more difficult unless an automatic ratchet is incorporated.  
While an effects-based approach generates great problems of its own in 
many contexts, it does offer an attractive available option for legislative 
action in the climate disruption context.  But even if we choose a 
legislated effects-based approach to an aggregate cap, BAT flaws can 
infect individual cap setting.  We should, however, avoid that problem 
through a market-based approach to allocationan auction.  To the 
extent that we continue to rely on administrative individual cap setting, 
recognition that trading does not circumvent the delays inherent in 
administrative processes subject to judicial review should lead to careful 
design of administrative tasks and procedures to minimize difficulties.  
Auctions also serve to avoid the favoritism to existing sources that 
characterizes traditional regulation and creative use of the revenue can 
make non-automatic cap adjustment more likely.  Hence, recognition 
                                                
266 Accord INSTITUTIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING, supra note 9, at 31 (concluding that the 
European ETS “still reflects a command-and-control approach”). 
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that trading often constitutes a form of BAT leads to important analytical 
and normative insights.          
 
